Ambivalent remains

China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

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Introduction

One of the visible legacies of Russia in China which reflect the ambivalence of the relationship in own ways, are cemeteries. While the most well-known of “foreigners’ cemeteries” in China today is in Shanghai, “hosting” mostly dead from the Western hemisphere in its present form and being conveniently located in the inner-city “Song Qingling Memorial Park” where it is integrated with the tombs of “famous Chinese” to flank the central figure of Song Qingling 宋庆龄 (Madame Sun Yat-sen) and her parents, the largest extant “foreigners’ cemetery” in China is Russian and in Manchuria: the so-called “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Lüshun 旅顺, formerly known in the West as “Port Arthur” (and now part of Dalian 大连 municipality). Notably, this cemetery is today part of Chinese patriotic education programs to honor the “martyrs” who died for the “liberation of China” from the Japanese in 1945, thus assigning to these foreigners a role in Chinese self-definition. De facto, this cemetery, though, not only “hosts” “Soviet Martyrs” (be it of the so-called “August Storm” of 1945, be it of the Korean War 1950-1953), but also the remains of people linked to tsarist times, most prominently to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05, which in Chinese eyes was a war fought between two foreign imperialists on Chinese (and Korean) soil. Thus, these dead stand for imperial Russia’s “aggression” in China, and their memorialization is anathema to the Chinese. This way, the cemetery, together with two further ones in the Dalian area where the Soviet Union held extraordinary rights after WW II well into the PRC (People’s Republic of China) times, embodies the tension and ambivalence surrounding Russian historical legacy in China.

1 I would like to thank my colleagues of the German-Russian project on “Chinese Perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century” for help with various details. For the financing of the necessary fieldwork, I am grateful to the DFG. A special thanks is due to my research assistant Anastasiia Dmitrenko. Several Chinese and Russian colleagues also helped with access to the cemeteries or to some materials.


3 The discussion of the appropriateness of the term “Manchuria” for the area which in China today is called “the Northeast” will not be repeated here: suffice it to say that I will keep the term here because it suggests a special characteristic of the area which has been under the influence of Russia (and Japan) in modern times that will concern us here.


While Lüshun and Dalian mark the southern end of the railway the Russians once built through Manchuria to connect to their East-West-linking Trans-Siberian Railway, at the northern nodal point in Manchuria, Harbin (Haerbin 哈尔滨), Chinese perceived ambivalence of Russian legacy is further augmented due to the particularly strong influence of Russian (“White”) émigré culture in the interwar years there. In fact, to those opposing and fleeing the Soviets, Harbin was usually the first choice in the Far East. Still, not all “Russians” in the city belonged to this group, which means that Harbin hosted a mix of different political and religious outlooks. This, too, is reflected in the cemeteries where, in fact, three are extant today: one Orthodox, one Jewish, and an extra one for the Soviets since 1945, the smallest of the three here. Harbin, too, provides a “superlative” in claiming the “largest Jewish cemetery of East Asia”, most of the dead being, again, Russian. While many Jews were present in China also elsewhere, most notably in Shanghai, only Harbin has kept a large cemetery which is nowadays playing an important role in Sino-Israeli relations, while the Orthodox and the Soviet cemetery involve, above all, Sino-Russian relations. Thus, the cases presented below reflect the multi-faceted influence of Russia in China: between early Tsarists, later “Whites” and Soviets in terms of politics, and Russian Orthodox and Jews in terms of religion. Furthermore, the “Japanese factor” for much of the time before the PRC was established, cannot be totally ignored either. Seen from the Chinese side, finally, the dealing with the remains involved the issues of imperialism, colonialism, revolution and heritage in both their domestic and international-diplomatic dimensions.

For contextualization, it should be pointed out that the cases addressed here, Harbin, Dalian (including Jinzhou 金州) and Lüshun, cannot claim to be the only Russian cemeteries in China still extant, though these are typically concentrated in Manchuria and along the railway line, making Manchuria the most pertinent area for the topic. Apart from some tombs connected to Soviet help to China in the early Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) in the larger Yangzi region, typically by aviators Stalin had sent to Guomindang国民党 (National Party)-governed China, there are some places closer to the border in Xinjiang and Mongolia (of which the “inner” part is PRC territory today) with casualties of 1945, i.e. the very last days of WW II. At some places in “China proper” like Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Wuhan and Shanghai where Russians had settled in greater numbers since the late 19th century over a somewhat longer period of time, the Russian cemeteries have, however, disappeared (as have most of the one-time “foreigners’” cemeteries in China). In all of China and in Manchuria in particular, apart from civilian dead at the places of Russian residential presence, the military was a very sizable group of those buried.

6 I follow the most widely used form of transcribing the city as “Harbin” in English instead of Chinese “Haerbin” (or the romanized Russian “Kharbin”).
7 For Shanghai, where several single Jewish tombstones of the once large Jewish cemeteries have been found but only a memorial to the Jewish presence has been set up in the new Chinese Fushouyuan福寿园 Cemetery, cf. the brief comments in Müller (2018a), pp. 31-32.
8 It should be kept in mind that the break-up of the Soviet Union means that today more countries are de facto involved, though Russia, of course, dominates.
Major conflicts involved the Boxer Uprising (1900/1901) which spread from Northern China also into Manchuria, and then, most importantly, the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05) which affected, again, mainly the southern part of Manchuria (and neighboring Korea). Still, since the railway was the main South-North link through Manchuria and back to Russia, wounded and dead were often transferred to major nodal points and thus were also “centrally buried”. This was helped by the fact that the railway zone, i.e. a strip of land along the railway, was leased to the Russians by the Qing since 1898 to ward off Japanese influence, where the Russians could freely decide on the land usage, although the Russians lost the southern part of that leased territory soon to the Japanese due to their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.

After the traumatic Russo-Japanese War and the troubled times of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Tsar ordered a first survey of Russian military tombs and cemeteries in Manchuria to be made, and in 1912 had several large crosses built to commemorate those soldiers that had lost their lives for “faith, Tsar and fatherland”. A 1938 Russian source, tellingly titled “Forgotten Graves”, from Harbin provides a glimpse into the state of Russian tombs and cemeteries up to the by then Manchukuo times. Here, a map shows clearly the locations being orientated along the railway. As mentioned, these Russian dead, though, are anathema to the Chinese and thus their tombs had less chance to survive after 1945. Only where a large group of Russians was still living, most notably in Harbin, or came with the Red Army to stay for a substantial time as in the Dalian-Lüshun area 1945-1955, they could look after the Russian tombs, Soviet and – at times – pre-Soviet, which also explains the feasibility to focus on these in the present study since they reflect the broader Russian legacy (and its perceived ambivalence) in China and are not only one-dimensionally Soviet.

Most of the still extant Russian cemeteries in Manchuria (and elsewhere in China), thus, are the less controversial Soviet ones, and they are usually connected to the fight against the Japanese, namely to the Soviet “August Storm” of 1945 to drive out and subdue the Japanese. Some of the tombs and memorials are further away from the railway and closer to the battle fields, often located at the borders. The memorials and steles set up by the Soviets typically frame this as a

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10 See the overview of extant Soviet tombs and memorials in China from the Chinese side in Tian Zhihe 田志和: Yongheng de huainian. Zhongguo tudishang de Sulian hongjun bei ta lingyuan 永恒的怀念。中国土地上的苏联红军碑塔陵园 (Eternal cherishing: Monuments and Cemeteries for the Soviet Red Army on Chinese soil), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2010. Tian, himself a member of the Chinese Communist Party, had the advantage to have had access to archival materials for his research. See also the (incomplete) summary included in Ma Dianwen’s book on the Lüshun Cemetery: Ma Dianwen 马殿文: Xuesa Zhonghua liuqingshi: Sujun lieshi lingyuan de gushi 血洒中华留青史。苏军烈士陵园的故事 (History of [those] shedding their blood in China in their prime: the story of the Soviet martyrs’ cemetery), Dalian: Liaoning shifan daxue chubanshe 2015, pp. 109-156.
“victory over Japanese fascism” and in the “defense of” or “to the glory of the USSR”, at times even stating that the “heroes” (the preferred Soviet term) died “for Stalin”. In any case, Soviet inscriptions are typically Soviet-centered without much attention to China and the Chinese. In Chinese perspective, though, this was a “liberation” of Northeast China by the Soviets (together with some Chinese resistance fighters) from the Japanese, for which the “martyrs” (lieshi 烈士, the preferred Chinese term which the Chinese themselves invariable translate as “martyr” into English) laid down their lives. The Chinese steles to the Soviet “martyrs”, therefore, rather stress the issues of internationalism and friendship in the “common fight” against the “common enemy”.  

One may note that in Chinese (modern) understanding, the term lieshi implies dying for “the cause”, while the Russian term “hero” (geroy) as such is less restricted in application and in that sense is also used in Chinese as yingxiong 英雄 (hero). In other words, an yingxiong may live on, while a lieshi does not. The strong Christian connotation of the term “martyr” who however does not seek martyrdom vis-à-vis the “hero” of whom the personal choice and agency is of primary importance, probably made for the Soviet preference for the latter term, while the Chinese felt the necessity to single out the blood price a lieshi paid, evoking ancient concepts of loyalty (and following up on Guomindang practices). In spite of the rocky relationship of the PRC with the Soviet Union after the 1950s, the Soviet tombs and cemeteries survived, though they were not necessarily spared of vandalism. Apart from the 1945 “August Storm”, also the Korean War (1950-1953) in which the Chinese participated officially and the Soviets unofficially, has left Soviet remains in the region. Thus, the cemeteries reflect also these histories in their own ways.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet military tombs and cemeteries in China were looked into by the Russian Ministry of Defense, mainly since the mid-1990s when a survey was done and published in 1997 by Ivanov (a former participant in the “August Storm”) et al., though obviously with a very restricted circulation. In 2004 another Russian fact-finding mission toured China, and in 2007 an accord was signed between both governments on the protection of

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11 See the various inscriptions provided in Tian Zhihe who tellingly orders his description of steles and memorials in “Soviet made” and “Chinese made”.

12 This large topic cannot be addressed here in full. Suffice it to say that the archetypical lieshi of Chinese antiquity, Boyi 伯夷 and Shuqi 叔齊, rather starved to death than serve the new dynasty. Whatever way a lieshi died, it was out of choice. The concept was attached to the nation not only with the Communists, but had been part of Guomindang state cult already and implied also various benefits for the relatives of those officially labeled a lieshi. One should also add that the Chinese Christians rather prefer other terms to translate “martyr”, usually combinations with the word xun 献 (to die in sacrifice), while the character lie 烈 evokes rather fiery resistance than meekness.

13 Here, the Cultural Revolution left its mark as elsewhere in China, but probably due to the closeness to the border and the intervention of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), the tombs of the “liberating” Soviets were basically kept. Since archives are not accessible, the details of what exactly happened are, however, unclear, and present-day Chinese sources remain predictably vague regarding the topic.

14 See [Vasily] Ivanov et al.: Vechnym snom spyat v Kitayskoy zemle: Memorial’ny al’bom (Resting eternally in Chinese soil: Memorial Album), Moscow: MAS 1997. I am grateful to Maxim Korolkov for helping me get access to this source. Ivanov et al. very briefly also address tsarist tombs of the Russo-Japanese War in an appendix.
Soviet tombs in China. These events, though, were not greatly publicized in China although they were made public in Russia. In fact, one of the outcomes of this study was to realize the sometimes stark difference not only in perspective but also in communication policies between both sides, reflecting also the Chinese ambivalence towards the sites who likely wanted to diplomatically demonstrate care to the Russians, but at the same time keep it low-key domestically. The cases presented here, i.e. Harbin, Dalian (with Jinzhou) and Lüshun, in short, are not the only ones of Russian/Soviet cemeteries in China, but they are clearly the most outstanding for the multi-facetted Russian role in China in general, and in Manchuria in particular.15

Although this study will concentrate on the Russians, one word should be added about the Japanese who were so dominant in Manchuria, especially after they won the Russo-Japanese War in 1904/05 which meant that therewith they had the basic say in Southern Manchuria. Later on, they extended this to the North after 1931 in the wake of the so-called “Manchurian Incident” and the subsequent creation of the “puppet state” Manchukuo.16 The Japanese cemeteries have largely disappeared, helped also by the fact that the Japanese practiced cremation and, when and where possible, shipped the remains back to Japan, knowing all too well after their defeat in 1945 that treatment would not be favorable, to say the least. Thus, the apparently only presently existing Japanese cemetery in Manchuria east of Harbin in Fangzheng 方正 county, is for those Japanese settlers who died in 1945/46, not making it out in time before the Soviet advance and being “abandoned” by their own army. These abandoned settlers were often interned there and died of starvation, diseases or suicide. The cemetery, though, was set up only many years later in PRC times in 1963 on (at least officially) private initiative and was relocated to the present site in 1984, when the Japanese Embassy also moved in newly discovered remains of collective suicides of Japanese abandoned settlers in 1945 elsewhere.17 The place is now called “Sino-Japanese Friendship Garden”, but has seen disputes and vandalism by Chinese nationalists when a monument with the names of settlers was set up in 2011.18 The new monument thus was

15 For a more complete picture of other extant Soviet cemeteries, see Tian Zhihe, Ma Dianwen, and Ivanov et al. Among the ones with larger numbers of Soviet dead are those in Hailar, Manzhouli, Qiqihar, Shenyang etc.
swiftly razed again.\textsuperscript{19} Since the role of the Japanese is seen from the Chinese side not as ambivalent as the Russian one, but as simply negative, searching for more information or remains would be even more challenging than with the Russians. It might be added that research about the Russian cemeteries was already hampered by a clear sense during fieldwork that such research was not going to be easy. Though the “real” staff of libraries or sites was always very kind and helpful, access to archives was barred, and even simple public library research was at times “surveyed” to a degree rare even for Chinese standards. Thus, this research turned out to be more like putting together pieces of a mosaic. Still, with some patience and mining, a rough picture emerged.

**Harbin**

Today, Harbin’s cemetery landscape provides a quite unique feature: the large Huangshan cemetery (Huangshan gongmu 皇山公墓, formerly: Huangshan zuizi gongmu 荒山咀子公墓)\textsuperscript{20} set up in the 1950s far to the east of the city, which nowadays hosts not only Chinese dead but also the largest Jewish cemetery in East Asia, a Christian orthodox one and one for Soviet “martyrs”. There were further sections designed for Muslims and other minorities as well, when the cemetery was set up. The Huangshan cemetery is thus a physical reminder of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious history of Harbin.

Before we may look into the cemetery itself and its prehistory, the larger context should be sketched out: Harbin’s history since the late 19th century was closely connected to Russian railway construction efforts. Although the railway city of Harbin was founded as such in 1898 by Russians in an area where several small hamlets existed which mainly lived off the Sungari


River (Songhua jiang 松花江), Chinese controversies about celebrating a centennial in 1998 made clear that Chinese authorities still feel obliged to minimize the “Russian definition” of Harbin, pointing out that there were people (if not necessarily Han Chinese) living in the area before.\(^{21}\) Up to today, there is thus a typical wavering between nationalist sentiments on the one hand to claim Harbin as “Chinese”, and the recognition of touristic “branding” potential provided by the “foreign” aspects of the city on the other, making it hard to decide how to position today’s Harbin vis-à-vis its “multi-cultural” past.\(^{22}\) In any case, back in the late 19th century, the Qing government in Beijing had granted the construction of the so-called Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) by treaty to Russia in the hope to counter Japanese encroachment in Manchuria after the latter had won the Sino-Japanese War 1894/95. Thus, a secret alliance with Russia seemed to be an expedient means for blocking the Japanese. Architects of this alliance were Minister of Finance, Sergey Witte, on the Russian, and Li Hongzhang 李鸿章, the most influential official for foreign affairs in the late 19th century, on the Qing side. Russia, in turn, could link the CER up to its Trans-Siberian Railway, forming a “T” by linking to the East to Vladivostok in a direct line, West to Chita, and to the South through all of Manchuria to the ports of Dalian and Port Arthur (Lüshun). The zone close to the railway tracks was handed as a concession to the Russians, too, who nominally did not act on a governmental level but via a private enterprise which raised funds through the Russo-Chinese Bank founded in 1895. The Russians started railway construction and set up the nucleus of the railway city of Harbin at the central juncture of the “T” in 1898, with the railway starting operation in 1903 under the long-term manager (until 1920) and “king of Harbin”, Dmitry Khorvat.\(^{23}\) Though Harbin is today the capital of Heilongjiang 黑龙江 Province, the area south of the Sungari River where the city was located belonged at the time still to the province of Jilin 吉林.

The first times for the new city were not easy, due to the Boxer Uprising which swept Northern China and parts of Manchuria, affecting also Harbin with a brief siege directly, and beyond this more indirectly, resulting in casualties above all in the year 1900. Thereafter the Russo-Japanese

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\(^{21}\) For the discussion on the “centennial”, see Thomas Lahusen: “A Place Called Harbin: Reflections on a Centennial”. In: The China Quarterly, no. 154 (1998), June, p. 400-410.

\(^{22}\) A typical example of this wavering is Xue Lianju 薛连举: 首尔 den jinghua: duoyuan wenhua 哈尔滨的精华。多元文化 (Harbin’s essence: its pluralistic culture), Harbin: Dongbei linye daxue chubanshe 2015.

\(^{23}\) A 1914 British consular report called Khorvat/Horvath (as he is often transcribed in Western sources) even as “king and god” of Harbin. See James H. Carter: Creating a Chinese Harbin: Nationalism in an International City, 1916-1932, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2002, p. 15. He at times also acted simultaneously as consul for the Russians. (See Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: Waishizhi 黑龙江省志。第六十九卷。外事志 (Heilongjiang province gazetteer; no. 69: gazetteer of foreign affairs), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1993, pp. 93-94). For a monumental collection of photos on the history of the railway which also contains a few pictures regarding cemeteries, see the album put together from the Russian side about the period of construction (1897-1903) preserved in the provincial museum and translated into Chinese for the 110th anniversary of the railway opening: Pang Xuechen 庞学臣 (ed.): Zhongdong tielu dahuace 中东铁路大画册 (Big Album on the Chinese Eastern Railway), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2013.
War of 1904/05 which to Russia meant the “loss” of rights in Southern Manchuria to the Japanese also left its mark on Harbin in the North, mostly by receiving wounded and dead. The periodic epidemics and plagues of the early years also cost many lives. Nevertheless, Harbin soon started to grow. Its foreign population was at first mostly hailing from the Russian Empire, but soon the city attracted also other Western nations, namely after the Russo-Japanese War and Harbin’s becoming a “treaty port” in 1907 which boosted the internationalization of the city. Apart from Westerners, there were also many Japanese (including the sizable group of Japanese prostitutes present in the city). The Japanese on the one hand wanted to do business but also on the other saw Harbin as a strategic location for extending influence into the whole area of Manchuria. This population mix implied there were diverse creeds and ethnicities present. Still, Russian as a language and the Orthodox faith in terms of religion dominated. Since the place needed also local services and provided opportunities of trade, it also attracted more and more Chinese over time, usually from Northern Chinese provinces. Whereas the foreigners mainly settled in the strip of land close by the railway which functioned as a Russian concession, the Chinese mainly lived in the neighboring area called “Fujiadian” (nowadays the Daowai district of the city of Harbin).

At first, the Russians had settled in “Old Harbin”, a part to the South of the present city center, since the area closer to the Sungari River was rather swampy. However, the place was soon found inconvenient and too far from the river, and thus, after draining the swamps, the railway station as the most important feature of the “Russian” city was placed somewhat more to the north, with “New Harbin” close-by. In between “New Harbin” and the Sungari the city developed further along the railway tracks. At the main junction close to the railway station the

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25 For a brief characterization of the various consulates opened in Harbin, see the Heilongjiang province gazetteer volume on foreign affairs: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), pp. 91-117.
26 In fact, gender-sensitive population figures (usually excluding the military, though!) show that it was only in 1916 that men were more numerous among the Japanese than women – a stark contrast to other nationalities. See, e.g., Xue Lianju: Haerbin renkou bianqian (The development of Harbin’s population), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1998, pp. 150-151. This was mainly due to prostitution.
27 For the early Japanese post-Russo-Japanese War designs for Manchuria, see, e.g., Matsusaka (2001).
28 On the Chinese migration to Manchuria from predominantly Shandong in the early 20th century, see Thomas R. Gottschang and Diana Lary: Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria, Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan 2000. Shandong had been the main supply of Han-Chinese settlers also at earlier times. It should be kept in mind that officially the Qing had allowed for Chinese settlement only in Southern Manchuria and had opened up the North of Manchuria, their “homeland”, only reluctantly and in piecemeal fashion in the late 19th century to counter foreign encroachment.
29 For a brief summary, see Carter (2001), p. 14-21. For some maps, see Ji Fenghui: Haerbin xun gen (Searching for the roots of Harbin), Harbin: Haerbin chubanshe 1996, pp. 58-67, notably starting in the 18th century insinuating, once more, that the “roots” of Harbin are pre-Russian.
St. Nikolay Cathedral, built of wood in the Vologda style, marked the “heart” of Russian presence in the city, and from there the longest road of “New Harbin” extended towards the Northeast, lined with foreign consulates, various churches and – cemeteries. In 1913, when a first detailed census of Harbin’s CER zone was done, it counted nearly 70,000 people of 53 nationalities with the most important languages spoken being Russian, Chinese, Polish and Yiddish. And in terms of religion, the Russian Orthodox who had been first administered by the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission of Beijing and since 1907 belonged to the newly established diocese of Vladivostok, were the major group, making up half of the total, followed by adherents of Chinese religions, the Jews and Catholics. In all, during the pre-Communist time, beyond the main group of Russian Orthodox, Harbin’s foreign population included groups of Old Believers, Molokans and Armenians in the larger Orthodox realm; Catholics (Roman and Eastern-rite Catholics); Adventists, Evangelical Christians, Lutherans, Baptists in the Protestant field; Jews and Karaites in the larger Jewish realm; Muslims; Japanese and Korean Christian and Buddhist groups; and adherents of the Japanese “new religion” Tenrikyō 天理教.

30 Early photos can be found, e.g., on postcards. See Cao Zengshen 曹增伸: Lao feng jiu pian Haerbin 老封旧片哈尔滨 (“Harbin in Old Envelopes and Cards”), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2008, pp. 97, 104, 153. See also the illustration sheets with further old photos until the church’s destruction in Ji Fenghui (1996).
32 Nicholas II granted the diocese of Vladivostok in 1907. For an insider summary of the Russian Orthodox Church in China until the early 20th century, see the overview by the key figure in Beijing, Bishop (later Metropolitan) Innokenty (Figurovsky), in 1916: “The Russian Orthodox Mission in China”. In: The Chinese Recorder, October 1, 1916, pp. 678-685.
33 Taken altogether, there was the impressive number of 21 Orthodox churches built in Harbin over time. For a map, see the Russian work of Kradin, focusing on architecture, translated into Chinese: N. P. Kelajin 克拉金: Haerbin: Eluosiren xinzhong de lixiang chengshi 哈尔滨。俄罗斯人心中的理想城市 (Harbin: ideal city in the minds of the Russians [note: the original title had „Harbin: Russian Atlantis“]), Harbin: Haerbin chubanshe 2007, p. 74. For short descriptions by a Harbin Russian émigré, see He Ying 贺颖 (ed.): Ta xiang yi guxiang: Eluosiren huiyi Haerbin 外乡亦故乡。俄罗斯人回忆哈尔滨 (Foreign land and homeland: Russians remember Harbin), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2010, pp. 168-183.
When the Romanovs were dethroned in 1917 and Civil War in Russia ensued, Harbin with its “tsarist” Russian population was directly affected and remained an important center for the “Whites” who held out the longest in Siberia and the Far East, and after the final defeat often took refuge in Harbin. Thus, the “typical” foreign sojourner in Harbin at that time was either a merchant or an émigré, and the Russian Civil War made for a huge influx of (often elite) refugees.

The whole city, including its “Chinese” parts, became even more integrated into one city when the Chinese did not recognize the privileges contracted with the tsarist government any longer after the October Revolution and Civil War, thus turning Harbin during the 1920s into a more and more “Chinese” city, if with a substantial (and ever shifting) foreign population. By now, the “old Harbiners”, i.e. those “Russians” who had come with the CER, including a substantial number of Russian Jews, but also Polish, Ukrainians etc., were joined by new waves of émigrés, mainly made up of “White” Russians who fled the Bolsheviks. The Beijing government which had first placed its bet on the “Whites”, by 1924 finally signed an accord with Moscow, diplomatically recognizing the Soviet Union, and thus the Russians in Harbin had to decide whether to align themselves with the “Soviets”, become “Chinese” or remain “stateless”, which often implied no access to all “Russian” institutions now taken over by the Soviets. For those not able or willing to emigrate further, this meant often a higher risk of poverty, and in fact also with burials the number of “stateless” in the “Russian” “pauper cemetery” which had to be set up in the 1930s was substantial. After the 1924 accord between the Beijing government and the Soviets who declared their readiness to forego several of the former tsarist privileges, the CER and the former CER zone were co-administered, which meant that jobs were now only for those either “Soviet” or “Chinese” (and all others dismissed). However, Sino-Soviet relations became more complicated after 1927 with a more assertive Chinese nationalism, the break-up of the United Front in China between the Nationalists and the Communists, and the power struggle in Moscow which removed the last obstacles to Stalin’s supremacy. In 1929, a major clash occurred between the Soviets and the Chinese over the railway rights, and after Japan’s invasion into Manchuria of 1931 and the subsequent establishment of the “puppet state” Manchukuo, the Soviet Union sold its railway rights to Japan in 1935, thus effectively ending Russian

37 For this, see, e.g., Carter (2001).
39 Thus, Russian aristocrats as drivers or former generals as piano teachers were not uncommon. See Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 124.
prerogatives but strengthening the Japanese, much to the chagrin of the Chinese who had not been informed of the deal beforehand.

For the foreign sojourners in Harbin, this was another period when many tried to leave, especially if they had opted for Soviet citizenship in the meantime which was now not opportune any longer in the Japanese-Manchukuo regime. The Japanese, on their side, were ambivalent towards the Russians and other foreigners, seeing them either as potential Soviet spies or as potential allies, if “right-wing” and anti-Bolshevist. After Pearl Harbor, the foreigners in Harbin from countries now officially at war with Japan were interned and expelled. Only the ones from “befriended nations” (Germany, Italy, “Vichy France”) kept their consulates running, and the many “stateless”, often former Russian “White” elites, including aristocrats or military leaders, and a sizable group of Jews, if they had not moved on to Shanghai, Hong Kong or overseas before, remained too. Many Russian Jews, in fact, had switched between a “Russian”, “Soviet” or “stateless” identity which made their group particularly hard to grasp from a Chinese point of view after the war and the founding of Israel to where they are nowadays foremost connected in Chinese minds. All those remaining during WW II faced again a problem when the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and marched into Manchuria in 1945 to force the Japanese-Manchukuo surrender. At this time, the Soviets also captured some of their one-time “White” enemies with predictable outcome. Locally, they made for a rather smooth transition of the city into Chinese Communist hands. Thus, during the Chinese Civil War, Harbin was basically already a Communist-directed city well before the PRC was officially established in Beijing in 1949 and thus was spared large-scale military confrontations devastating other parts of Manchuria. This, again, made Harbin somewhat special, since Manchuria was one of the key areas where the Civil War and therewith the future of China was decided, but locally experiences de facto differed widely over the area.

42 Cf. Zhao Xigang 赵喜罡: “Haerbin de youtairen” 哈尔滨的犹太人 (Harbin’s Jews). In: Haerbin wenshi ziliao 哈尔滨文史资料 (Materials on history and culture of Harbin) no. 19, 1995, pp. 267-274, there p. 267. See also the provincial gazetteer on “population”: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di wushiqi juan: renkouzhi 黑龙江省志。第五十七卷。人口志 (Heilongjiang provincial gazetteer no. 57: population gazetteer), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 哈尔滨人民出版社 1996, which has difficulties to statistically group the Jews. One may further note that it was above all the Japanese who had kept statistics of the foreign population already before their occupation of Manchuria: cf. Xue Lianju 薛连菊 (1998), pp. 137-142, who bases himself on Japanese yearly statistics kept since 1916. Notably, the Japanese – in spite of having recognized the Soviets officially since 1925 – switched the category of “Russian” to “Soviet” only as late as 1927! (See there statistics on p. 137).
The “political problem” of many Russians who had remained up to 1945, however, not only concerned the living, but also the dead and their memorialization. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets showed only interest in protecting tombs of “their own people” in Harbin subsequently, and thus it was with the Soviet Consulate’s approval that the Chinese PRC authorities used the area where many foreigners had been buried, levelling most tombs in that area, to build the present-day “Culture Park” there in the 1950s, as long as the “Soviet Martyrs’ tombs” were preserved.

In fact, turning to the problem of cemeteries, the multi-cultural and multi-religious history of Harbin had consequences well beyond life. When it came to death, religion became a very important issue, and thus cemeteries had been set up for different creeds.44 Unsurprisingly, the Russian Orthodox were the first, but also many Russian Jews lived in Harbin who soon had their own cemetery adjacent to the Orthodox one. When the foreign community became ever more pluralized, further ones were set up for Catholics (e.g. Poles, but also some Italians, Spaniards, French or Portuguese) and Protestants (e.g. Germans, Estonians, Latvians, British, Americans, Canadians, Danes, Dutch etc.),45 Muslims and others.46 Basically, before the founding of the PRC, the Orthodox had two large cemeteries: the “old” one close to the city center at the so-called Ukrainian Church which basically stopped new interment in 1927,47 and the “new” one, founded not much later than the “old” one, further up the main Northeast axis at today’s “Culture Park”. The Jews had theirs set up adjacent to the Orthodox ones, with the old one obviously shifted to the new location at the present-day “Culture Park” to be thereafter the only Jewish one,48 and the other Western nations had a “united” one, also called “7-countries graveyard” (which then was turned into a 6-country one when the Poles set up their own) (for more details see below).49 Those were all basically in the wider area of today’s “Culture Park”. After 1945 the Soviet “martyrs” who died combating the Japanese in the last days of WW II were buried in the

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45 “Protestant” denominations of locally notable size included Lutherans, but also Baptists and Adventists, Evangelical Christians, Presbyterians and Methodists. 
46 It should be noted that most Christian denominations, Judaism (including the Karaites) as well as Islam were present also in the Russian empire itself; thus the different cemeteries were needed also for “Russians”. Cf. the overview of “Russian émigrés” in terms of religion in Shi Fang 石方 et al.: Haerbin eqiaoshi 哈尔滨俄侨史 (History of Russian émigrés in Harbin), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2003, pp. 443-449. See also there pp. 478-479 for a table of religious activities centers of the non-Orthodox “Russians”. This book provides also some very interesting glimpses into individual cases from archival files obviously created after WW II (pp. 449-469).  
47 Cf. Kelajin (Kradin) (2007), p. 118 and p. 120. For the church, see below.  
48 This is claimed by Zhang Tiejiang, one of the main scholars in Harbin working on the local Jews and the one considering the cemetery most, in various publications. See, e.g., the latest version in 2017: Zhang Tiejiang 张铁江: Zhongguo dongbei youtairen yanjiu 中国东北犹太人研究 (Study on the Jews in Northeast China), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2017, p. 274-275.  
49 Apart from the fact that the Poles had their own “country” only again in 1918, it seems that the naming of the cemetery as “seven countries” was prevalent only in Chinese: rather, the differentiation was according to faith. Thus, often the naming of “united” cemetery appears, too (see below). Cf. also the Foreign Affairs volume of the Heilongjiang Provincial gazette: Heilongjiang shengzi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi 1993, p. 186.
“Culture Park” area as well, together with Soviet advisors of the early days of PRC times. However, these “good” Soviet brothers were spatially distinguished from the pre-PRC “problematic” ones associated with Russian imperialism or “White” Russians hostile to Communism who had fled before the Bolsheviks to Harbin in pre-PRC times.

When the Harbin municipality wanted to develop the by now inner-city area of today’s “Culture Park” in the 1950s, the question arose as to what to do with all those tombs. The solution was to set up a new cemetery way out of the city to the East, the Huangshan cemetery, and offer to transfer those tombs who still had people to care for (and pay for the transfer). Only the “friendly” Soviet “martyrs” were exempted who would remain at the “Culture Park” location until 2007 when they, too, were shifted to the Huangshan cemetery. Notably, although that 2007 transfer to Huangshan and the Sino-Russian opening ceremony is detailed on the on-spot plaque and was reported in the Russian press, the local Chinese press did not even mention it – a proof of the fact that China’s diplomatic actions are careful in considering target groups in terms of an international “cooperative” appearance, while keeping silent to the Chinese audience at home. At the Huangshan cemetery, then, those Westerners’ tombs transferred in the late 1950s were basically divided between two sections: the Jews went to the Jewish section, the Orthodox (and some others) to the Orthodox section. And the later transferred Soviet “martyrs” make up a third section.

In 1973 at a time when the Foreign Ministry in Beijing asked for all places in China to check for the status of foreigners’ tombs, a first attempt to repair the broken steles in the foreigners’ sections of the Huangshan cemetery was undertaken, and in 1977 an official proclamation argued for the preservation of foreigners’ tombs. Some “irregular” Chinese interments were removed. In 1987 and 1990 further repairs were undertaken, and in the 1990s, i.e. in the context of the warming of ties between Israel and the PRC in 1992 on the one hand and a new relationship with post-Soviet Russia on the other, the whole place was renamed, as mentioned, by choosing more “positive” characters for “Huangshan”: 皇山 (imperial mountain). Subsequently, the destroyed chapel in the orthodox section, the wood of which had been used by locals during the Cultural Revolution, was rebuilt in 1995 (though as of now not usually open but for special services).

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50 The local daily, *Haerbin Ribao* 哈尔滨日报 (Harbin Daily) notably did not mention the transfer and the opening ceremony in the presence of the Foreign Secretaries of China and Russia, though reporting that Russian Foreign Secretary Lavrov was in the city “for talks”. (See below).
52 This could mean that since only the foreigners’ and Muslim sections were officially still open for earth burials, some Chinese might have tried to circumvent cremation this way. Cf. *Haerbinshi minzhengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui* (1991), p. 238.
54 *Haerbinshi minzhengju* (1999), p. 173. It should be also mentioned that the 1960s to early 1970s were apparently hard times for Harbin’s population not only because of the Cultural Revolution, but also because of the preceding...
and the Jews were provided with a new building for ritual washing etc. before burial as well. And this “care” of Harbin for the two main groups of foreigners, the Russians (subdivided into the Orthodox and the Soviets) and the (de facto mostly Russian) Jews, is very much used today in the context of foreign relations with Russia and Israel.\(^{55}\)

Given this general picture, the following now tries to unravel the history behind the present situation. Since the local archives (Harbin City Archives and Heilongjiang Provincial Archives) were barring foreigners at the time of research, a reconstruction of what exactly happened with Russian (foreigners’) tombs in Harbin needs to use circumstantial evidence. Still, from what is available, \(^{56}\) a rough picture can be pieced together. This will be done in several steps: first looking at the pre-PRC history of burials, then at the transfer, and finally at the present situation with the different groups: Orthodox, Jewish and “Soviet”.

In **pre-PRC times**, the largest group of foreign burials in Harbin clearly was the Orthodox. With the advent of the Russians in the area, the necessity to provide a burial space for them arose, and thus already in 1898 a first Russian cemetery in “Old Harbin” was set up of which, however, no traces remain.\(^{57}\) In 1899, the “old Orthodox cemetery” was set up at the main road leading to the Northeast, though the present church (the “Ukrainian church”, functioning as the only active Orthodox church today) was built as a funeral church only in 1930.\(^{58}\) Given the high numbers of Ukrainians, it was mainly set up for them, since there were other churches for Russians already in place in Harbin. The tiny roped-off memorial building still preserved close by the church [ill.

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\(^{55}\) A similar development has been found in the case of Guangzhou and Shanghai. See Müller (2018a). As stated before, the Jews are categorized as an own “nationality” by the Chinese.

\(^{56}\) As far as the Chinese side is concerned, one may note the strong influence of the local gazetteer historiography of the 1980s and 1990s on most later Chinese publications (not the least because archival access has been restricted at times even for Chinese researchers). For the context and main thrust of that decisive historiographical enterprise (being part of a nation-wide call for continuing the old gazetteer tradition), see Søren Clausen and Stig Thøgersen: *The Making of a Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 1995, esp. chapter 5. Some gazetteers claim to cite archival sources, others don’t explicitly, while some Chinese researchers since the mid-1990s could use archives and cited them. Thus, where possible, the following will try to hold multiple sources against each other and draw in also some Russian or other non-Chinese material, when available.

\(^{57}\) See, e.g., Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 65. This source (cf. above note 20) is the most specified one on the topic of funerary affairs although at closer scrutiny it reveals various notable omissions and some contradictions. It has therefore to be used in tandem with other sources to counter-check. Notably, also this source insists that the area was “Chinese” before the advent of the Russians, and thus the Chinese “Wang clan graveyard” (Wang jia yidi 王家义地) is mentioned as “the oldest” cemetery, dating from 1876. (See ibid. p. 58).

\(^{58}\) Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 65. For a 1930s photo of the church and cemetery, see e.g. Cao Zengshen (2008), p. 155. (Though the English identification on the photo as “Catholic” is wrong, the Japanese one identifies the church correctly as the “Ukrainian” church). (Cao gives no dating, but Ji Fenghui (1996), p. 201, dates the photo to 1930.)
1] was part of the “old” cemetery and dedicated to the fallen in the Boxer Uprising – a fact present-day Chinese sources usually avoid to mention.\(^{59}\) Before the “Ukrainian church” was built adjacent to the cemetery, the St. Nikolay Cathedral (built in 1899 and consecrated in 1900) at the crucial central road junction of “New” Harbin from where the main roads started, had been responsible for this “old” cemetery which by 1936 was said to host roughly 1,000 tombs.\(^{60}\) Harbin, which served as the center of Russian émigré life in Northeastern China, was raised to the status of diocese in 1922, emancipating her officially from Vladivostok after the latter had “fallen to the Reds”. This was done by the by-now Serbia-based “Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia” (ROCOR), \(^{61}\) to which Harbin aligned, appointing Methodius/Mefody (Gerasimov) as the first archbishop (and later metropolitan) of Harbin. He and some other clergy, though, were buried on the Cathedral’s grounds, not in the “old” cemetery which by then, as stated, had the “Ukrainian church” as a funeral church, by this relieving the Cathedral from this duty. The burial of the archbishop and metropolitan on the Cathedral’s ground, in turn, strengthened the symbolic central function of St. Nikolay for the Orthodox.

Here, it should be added that the St. Nikolay Cathedral at the very heart of the railway city was the religiously paramount orthodox church in Harbin throughout and remained in place until the Cultural Revolution when it was torn down as a key symbol of “imperialism” – an act that has become iconic for Red Guard destruction. Photos taken at the occasion by a local journalist who attended a reception of a delegation from Albania in a building opposite the Cathedral, were published years later in the post-Cultural Revolution “old photos” collection project intended to gather “history from below”, making the case famous nation-wide.\(^{62}\) As became clear,

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\(^{59}\) Most Chinese sources tend to tellingly skip this eye-catching small building or to label it only vaguely as a “prayer house”. Kelajin (Kradin) (2007), pp. 78-79, briefly addresses it.

\(^{60}\) Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 81.

\(^{61}\) After the October revolution and the final creation of the Harbin diocese in 1922 in the wake of the “fall” of Vladivostok to the Bolsheviks, Harbin rather opted to align with the ROCOR than Moscow and only switched to the Moscow Patriarchate after the Soviets had taken Harbin in 1945. For a more general (though Beijing-centered) overview on the Russian Orthodox Church in China in English, see the time-relevant chapters on the “Russian Orthodox Church” by Alexander Lomanov in R.G. Tiedemann (ed.): *Handbook of Christianity in China* vol. II: *1800 to the Present*, Leiden and Boston: Brill 2010, pp. 553-563 and 826-836. For a Chinese official description, see the Foreign Affairs volume of the Heilongjiang province gazetteer: *Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi* (1993), pp. 143-145.

\(^{62}\) See Dong Shi 董时: “Nigula jiaotang bei hui jishi” 尼古拉教堂被毁纪实 (Record of the destruction of the Nikolay church). In: *Lao zhaopian* 老照片 (Old photos), vol. 4, 1997, pp. 50-54. At the occasion, two local journalists had made photos but only those of one survived. For a brief more personal literary account, cf. the Harbin writer [Wang] Acheng 阿成 who reflects on local history, e.g. in *Haerbinren* 哈尔滨人 (Harbiners), Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe 2014, p. 30, describing the Red Guards’ destruction and the hurt feelings of a Russian observing it to whom there was still something holy. ([Wang] Acheng should not be confounded with the more well-known Chinese writer and playwright [Zhong] Acheng). The “hurt feelings” of Russians residents observing this became known at the time by some letters which managed to come through to the West. See, e.g., the article with photos which appeared in Germany soon after the destruction of the St. Nikolay Cathedral (which also included destruction of the archive of the diocese), citing a letter: “Die Leidensgeschichte der orthodoxen russischen und
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lāshun
destruction was not wanton, but fairly systematic, not the least to avoid accidents when
dismantling the church. Ideologically, the aim was to reclaim the city’s perceived foreign “center”
with a Chinese “revolutionary stele” erected instead (which – irony of history – later was
dismantled, too, when Cultural Revolution champion Lin Biao’s 林彪 faction went out of
favor).63 The place of the former Cathedral which had been nicknamed by the Chinese in pre-
PRC times “Lama dais” (lamatai 喇嘛台),64 tells of its politicized past by being today forcefully
“de-politicized” and turned into a mere traffic circle. However, in view of the particular
historical importance of the St. Nikolay Cathedral, the church was recently rebuilt with much
attention to architectural detail outside the city, but in a tellingly commercialized surrounding
(and – needless to say – without any religious function):65 the pricy Russian theme park “Volga
Manor” (Fuerjia zhuangyuan 伏尔加庄园)!66

Furthermore, in the context of burials and the St. Nikolay Cathedral, one should also point out
that it had been put to instrumental use in this regard during Manchukuo times: it was the
Japanese who ordered the contested “political” burial of a non-cleric young Orthodox Russian,
the émigré minor officer Natarov. He had fallen for the Manchukuo/Japanese side in the armed
conflict with the Soviets at Nomonhan in 1939, a conflict provoked by the Japanese Kwantung
(Guandong/Kantô) Army (without authorization from Tokyo).67 Although – or maybe just
because – the Nomonhan adventure went wrong for the Kwantung Army,68 Natarov was buried
with great fanfare upon the wish of the Manchukuo/Japanese authorities on the Cathedral’s
grounds as a hero fighting “against the Comintern” in the showcased presence of all higher

63 For the metamorphoses of this nodal point in the city, see Liu Yannian 刘延年: Haerbin jiyi 哈尔滨记忆
(“Memory of Harbin”), Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe 2013, pp. 437-442.
64 The folk appellation of orthodox priests as “lamas” bespeaks, needless to say, the influence of Buddhism.
65 For one of the few Chinese more sensitive evaluations of such ways of “treating” Russian tangible cultural
heritage, see Rong Jie 荣洁 et al.: Eqiao yu Heilongjiang wenhua: Eluosi qiaomin dui Haerbin de yingxiang 俄侨与
黑龙江文化. 俄罗斯侨民对哈尔滨的影响 (Russian émigrés and Heilongjiang culture. The influence of Russian
émigrés on Harbin), Harbin: Heilongjiang daxue chubanshe 2013.
66 For a remarkable TV documentary which narrates the story of the cathedral, its destruction and “resurrection”
in Volga Manor by a Shanghainese investor as a “happy end”, see the 2010 CCTV 4 program in two installments:
Xiaoshi de jianzhu. Sheng Nigula jiaotang chuanqi 消失的建筑. 圣尼古拉大教堂传奇 (Vanished architecture. The
legendary story of the St. Nikolay church). Here the two local journalist witnesses of 1966 are also interviewed.
VIDE135516938525748.shtml.
67 On this border conflict, see Stuart Goldman: Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory That Shaped World War
68 Although casualties on the Soviet side were higher, they won the contest, and Tokyo (displeased by the Kwantung
Army’s unauthorized actions already) asked for peace again.
Orthodox clergy of Harbin. Subsequently, a large monument was added in 1941 at the Cathedral Square for all the fallen “fighters against Communism” which was inaugurated again in the presence of all the important Orthodox clergy of Harbin who still agreed to cooperate with the authorities at this point. (The cooperation only ran into a severe crisis when the Japanese wanted the Orthodox to conform to State Shintō rituals which crossed the red line.) When the Soviets entered Harbin in 1945, they blew up the tomb of Natarov, razed the monument and erected a monument for those comrades who had died during the “August Storm” instead. This all shows the high symbolic value of the Cathedral’s square and burials there, but also that this central identifying space had been wrought from the Orthodox in signification.

Apart from the Cathedral, another early small Russian burial place was connected to the Amur Army with its own church dedicated to the Iveron icon, just north of the railway station, built in 1907 and dedicated in 1908. It was the place to collectively commemorate the fallen soldiers, above all in the Russo-Japanese war which waged, however, further south in Manchuria. Since it is connected explicitly to the Russian tsarist military, its conservation is especially controversial among the population of Harbin to this day. This came into new focus with the issue of the tomb of the Russian imperial officer and anti-Bolshevik Vladimir Kappel who died of frostbite

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69 For this instrumental use of the Orthodox Church by the Japanese which was highly disputed among the Orthodox, see Ilya Kharin: After Nicholas: Self-Realization of the Japanese Orthodox Church 1912-1956, Gloucester: Wide Margin 2014, p. 277. For the hero cult around Natarov, see the new article of Evgeny Yakovkin: ““Ubit pod Nomonkhanom”: sozdanie kul’ta geroya kak primer antisovetskoy propagandy v srede rossiyskoy dal’nevostochnoy emigratsii (1939–1945 gg.)” (“Killed at Nomonhan”: Creation of the hero cult as an example of anti-Soviet propaganda among the Russian Far Eastern Emigration (1939–1945)). In: Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka (Problems of the Far East), 2019 no. 2, pp. 144-150.

70 For the monument and illustrations of the event, see the report in the local Russian weekly Rubezh (frontier), June 21, 1941.

71 See the entry on the orthodox website on the St. Nikolay Church: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/nikolai_en.htm. (It should be noted that this website provides entries in English, Russian and Chinese, although the contents at times differ widely between the three language versions.) For the blowing up of the tomb, see Yakovkin (2019), p. 148.

72 In fact, there were even two churches in Harbin (and one chapel) dedicated to the Iveron icon (which was said to have shown its protective forces during Napoleon’s attack on Moscow). The Russian émigrés in Harbin took apparently great pride in preserving Russian traditions under attack at the time in the Soviet Union. See Kelajin (Kradin) (2007), p. 87. Some of the buried and/or commemorated soldiers had been transported there from Lüshun (during the Russo-Japanese War, and list of names were put up on the walls. See the description by a Russian émigré cited in He Ying (2010), p. 176.

73 The church, heavily damaged in August 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, was put on the agenda for repair in 2004. (“Harbin to rebuild Orthodox church”, 2004, December 10. Available online: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/10/content_399092.htm). In 2017, the local government had announced a new restoration plan. See Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Shi Shu 史书: “Haerbin Sheng Yiweier jiaotang lishi gouchen” 哈尔滨圣伊维尔教堂历史钩沉 (Historical hook of the Holy Iveron Church in Harbin). In: Xiboliya yanjiu 西伯利亚研究 (“Siberian Studies”) vol. 45, no. 4, August 2018, pp. 89-92. The restoration project was sustained also by Russians. See Sergey Eryomin: “Iversky chram v Kharbine” (The Iveron Church in Harbin), February 6, 2017. Available online: http://www.unification.com.au/articles/3627/. The church is visible from the train station and is now seen with its rebuilt onion domes and cleared from subsequently added buildings around, as a picturesque advertisement for Harbin’s “Russian touch” to every tourist coming by (though the church remained closed as of 2018).
and on-the-road amputation in 1920 on the famous Great Siberian Ice March after the fall of the Siberian “White” regime of Admiral Kolchak on retreat with his last forces (the “kappelevtsy”). Fearing the advancing Bolsheviks who were on record to desecrate tombs of their political enemies (and thus were also providing a Soviet example to PRC practices), the “Whites” dug out the already buried Kappel again and transported his coffin to Harbin where they reburied him in the grounds of the Iveron church. In the context of increasing reappraisal of the “White” generals in Russia in the 2000s, his remains have been claimed by Russian activists and transferred back in late 2006 to bury Kappel with all honors in early 2007 in Moscow aside other “White” leaders, whereas in Harbin the topic was not mentioned any further. The tomb in Harbin had been controversial anyway, and in the 1950s it was already desecrated with the approval of the Soviets.

While the Iveron church with its high visibility due to the location near the railway station is thus a complicated case, one might note that today the most advertised church of Harbin is the St. Sophia church, which is architectonically speaking lavish, but as a “major historical and cultural site protected at the national level” now does not serve for religious purposes, but as a museum of Harbin’s architectural history. It, however, de facto was also the burial place of its designers.

The main Russian orthodox burial ground in Harbin, however, was clearly the “new Orthodox cemetery” which was set up already in 1902 in the area of today’s “Culture Park”, i.e. further up Northeast on the main Northeastern axis where the “old” one was situated as well, since the rising death rate required more burial space. This development was partly due to diseases and

74 This, by the way, suggests that beyond a sometimes argued-for “cultural” explanation for the desecration of tombs in the PRC, the “political” desecration of tombs had also Soviet models (and many more).
75 For some photos, see Sergey Korshunov (transl. by Asitu wenhua xilie congshu bianxiezu): Yige Eluosiren de Haerbin qingjie 一个俄罗斯人的哈尔滨情结 (A Russian’s Harbin complex), Harbin: Haerbin gongye daxue chubanshe 2015, p. 78.
76 The “White” generals have lived through an officially sanctioned revival recently in Russia, although there are controversies also there. The initiative thus usually rests with private groups, despite signs of official support. E.g., the burial of Kappel originally intended for the place in Siberia where he died was locally denied, and thus it was the Moscow patriarch who had him buried in the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow. See Sergey Verevkin: “Kappel: vtoraya bitva generala. Geroy ne nashol pokoya i posle smerti” (Kappel: the second battle of the general. The hero didn’t find peace even after death). In: Nashe vremya (Our times), [2007], available online: https://www.gazetanv.ru/article/?id=867. For a short Chinese summary, see Liu Yannian (2016), pp. 208-211.
77 For an account by a member of the finding commission in 2006, Irina Chudnova, about the exhumation process with Russian media coverage, see http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/harbin/20061222kappel_en.htm.
78 On the different “versions” of the St. Sophia church through history and its architects, see, e.g., Kelajin (Kradin), pp. 90-101. For the architects buried there in 1932, see the description by a Russian émigré cited in He Ying (2010), p. 173.
periodic epidemics which at times even necessitated extra plague cemeteries, but also because of armed conflicts, from the Boxer Uprising (1900/01) which led to a lot of violence from all sides, with Russian victims often being transported to Harbin, to the Russo-Japanese War (1904/05), since Harbin had the best medical facilities (and at times could organize a transfer via the railway back to Russia). The use of the more inner-city “old cemetery”, thus, was increasingly reserved for more special cases, while the usual one was now to be the “new” cemetery. As mentioned, a 1936 survey counted around 1.000 burials in the “old” one, but the “new Orthodox cemetery” hosted the impressive number of over 23.000 tombs by then. The Jews, mostly from the Russian empire, had their own cemetery, first in an angle of the “old” and then aside the “new” Russian orthodox one, and the Japanese since 1912 and the Koreans since 1917 also had their own cemeteries, all in the area close by the present “Culture Park”. And finally a further Russian “pauper” cemetery was set up in 1936 close to the Confucius Temple, where many of the “White Russians” and others now “stateless” were buried. Beyond the walls of the Jewish cemetery, the Karaïtes, a Jewish group not recognized by most other Jews, had their own burial ground as part of the “united” one. After the area of Harbin had been basically secured by the Chinese Communists in 1946 with the help of the Soviets who had slowed down military retreat after their victory over the Japanese in 1945 to give an advantage to the CCP, and thus well before the official founding of the PRC in 1949, the new local Hygiene Department made a survey in 1948, stating that in terms of foreigners’ tombs there were 37.000 “Russian” (obviously intending Orthodox) ones, 2.270 Jewish, and 2.266 in the one-time “7-countries graveyard” left over.

The latter “7-countries graveyard”, in turn, had been set up even earlier than the “new Orthodox” one, namely in 1900 (close to the present-day “Culture Park” area as well and thus, as it seems, leading the way to turn that whole area into use for cemeteries). According to the statistics, the “7 countries” intended the Czechs, Germans, French, Americans, British, Polish and Italians (until the Polish separated theirs from the then “6-countries cemetery”). However, this

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80 There has been at least one extra plague cemetery in Harbin since remnants have been found on the grounds of the University of Engineering. (See “Gongcheng daxue yuannei faxian shuyi siwangzhe ‘hetongbei’” (The “collective stele” for those who died from plague discovered on the campus of the University of Engineering)). In: Harbin ribao (Harbin Daily) May 30, 2009, p. 3). For some old photos, see Pang Xuechen (2013), p. 113, photo 6 and 7. This cemetery had been apparently moved to the grounds of the University of Engineering from a former location. See He Ying (2010), p. 186.
83 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 67. For the full statistics of 1948, see ibid. p. 79.
84 The area of the “7-countries graveyard” served for setting up a center for sports on ice later.
85 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 65. The term “7-countries graveyard” (qiguo yidi 七国义地) appears in Manchukuo sources. Cf. Haerbinshi minzhengzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.): Haerbin minzhengzhi (Harbin municipality civic policy gazetteer). Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1991, pp. 244-245, citing a 1936 statistic. It obviously was then taken over by the Chinese Communists in their 1948 survey.
appellation as “7-countries graveyard” taken over from Manchukuo times hardly reflected the cemetery’s nature at its beginning, since e.g. the Polish were at the time still “Russian” subjects. In fact, other sources, call it a “united cemetery”. This is at times termed as “Catholic united” or “Christian/Protestant united” in Chinese, but there were obviously also cemetery sections for the non-Christian Jewish Karaites, and the Muslim Tartars who actually belonged to the category of “Russians” as well. Thus, although the Manchukuo-Japanese as well as the Chinese administrations tried to frame it along nationality, the real issue was religion. As one source suggests, it might have been the Catholics to first set up a cemetery which then was “enlarged” with further sections. This is highly plausible, given the fact that there were several Catholic Poles (at the time tsarist subjects) working for the railway from the start who would have required a consecrated burial space of their own. Either way, this suggests the cemetery was a combination of various subsections, given the different creeds represented, which prevailed over the “nationality factor”, and assembled all those not Orthodox and not (mainstream) Jewish among the non-Asian foreigners in “faith-specific” sections. Of all these, the Catholics (Roman Catholic and Eastern-rite Catholic) were reported to have had an own Russian-speaking keeper as long as up to the transfer of 1958. Since the Chinese gazetteers usually mention only the Orthodox, Jewish and Catholic cemeteries as still somehow functioning at the time of transfer in 1958, one may infer that the Catholic one which mainly was for the Poles owed this to the fact that Poles (like the “Russians”, including the Russian Jews) were counting as “socialist brothers”. It might be also noted that the “Eastern-rite Catholics”, often from Lithuania or Belarus, had close connections to the Russian Orthodox in Harbin throughout. The Chinese Catholics, though, at the time were already massively under pressure in the context of the split between the Vatican-loyal “underground Catholics” and the official “patriotic Catholics”. And one should briefly recall that in Manchuria there had not been only foreign missionaries from Western countries, but also quite a few Koreans acting as clergy.

To add to the picture of cemeteries in Harbin in pre-PRC times, it should be at least briefly mentioned that the Chinese who had flocked to the growing “railway city” of Harbin in increasing numbers, of course also had their cemeteries: either set up by clans, or – more often – by native place organizations, since many Chinese hailed from either Shandong, Hunan and

86 Cf. the article on Karaites, citing archival sources for the cemetery as part of the “Catholic united” one: Wang Zhijun 王志军: “Haerbin de youtairen yu kalayimuren” 哈尔滨的犹太人与卡拉伊姆人 (Harbin’s Jews and Karaites). In: Liaoning shifan daxue xuebao 辽宁师范大学学报 vol. 29, no. 6, November 2011, pp. 116-118.
They, too, located their cemeteries increasingly to the East of the city. There was even a separate Catholic one since 1911 in the Chinese area of the city, and a protestant one since 1921. It should be noted that, administratively speaking, the railway concession zone, as long as it existed, was separate from the outside. This means, e.g., that the Catholics in the concession zone were looked after by usually Polish priests, while the Chinese Catholics (and those Catholic foreigners living outside the concession zone) were mostly looked after by French ones. The biggest Chinese cemetery (and most “upper class”), though, was the one of the Buddhist Jilesi 极乐寺 Temple, neighboring today’s “Culture Park”, and there was also a Chinese “pauper” cemetery close to the “stateless” one in the Confucius Temple area. In fact, the construction of the Jilesi and the Confucius Temple were seen by the Chinese in the city as a way to counter the “Russian Harbin” with a more and more “Chinese Harbin”. And thus the Chinese cemeteries close by laid their own spatial claim to the city’s “deathscape”. In sum, the East of the city became the “favorite” place for setting up cemeteries, and at the time of the 1948 survey there were in all, Chinese and non-Chinese, 18 “large” cemeteries with 189.860 tombs counted.

Moving now into PRC times and the issue of transfer, it should be recalled that by 1953, at a time when the Korean War which affected also neighboring Manchuria, ended, most foreigners had been forced to leave China, especially the “capitalist” ones of Western countries or Christian missionaries. The Korean War had been accompanied by a wave of anti-Western (mainly anti-US) propaganda in China herself, insinuating that Westerners (and missionaries in particular) were potential spies and should leave (sometimes after imprisonment). Some Chinese Protestants in Harbin (which had already been “united” from various denominations on government orders at this time), on the other hand, even were said to have donated weapons as a “positive” response to the “help Korea, resist the US” campaign in late 1950, proving their loyalty to the new state. In short, by the mid-1950s the number of foreigners living in Harbin was limited to mostly those of “socialist brother countries”. Furthermore, with peace finally reigning, city development became a priority. Thus, the municipality of Harbin decided to set up a new cemetery called Huangshan 荒山 (lit.: barren mountain) to the far East of the city, intending to transfer (or else:

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90 Apart from the Wang clan which set up its cemetery in 1876, in 1900 the Lu clan set up its own, and later some native place organizations, e.g. the people from Shandong or later Hunan and Hubei or Hebei.
93 See Haerbinshi Daowaiqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 哈尔滨市道外区地方志编纂委员会: Daowaiqu zhi (Daowai district gazetteer), Beijing: Zhongguo dabaite quanshu chubanshe 1995, p. 660.
95 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 5. The statistics in ibid. pp. 82-83, name 23 (non-foreign) ones alone as of 1936! It is not clear whether in 1948 some had disappeared already or just were not counted as being “large”.
level) all inner-city tombs, basically aiming at using the space for parks – as was the practice also elsewhere in China. First, the Chinese cemeteries had been closed one after the other, but then also the many foreigners’ tombs had to be “dealt with” finally in 1958.

Another notable development in 1958 with regard to burials was the municipal authorities’ decision to set up a “Revolutionary Cemetery” which would include those Chinese who died for the Communist “cause” (the “Martyrs”), but also “old cadres” and “revolutionary soldiers”, placed at first to the Southeast of the city. This, too, was decided to be moved later in 1983 to the vicinity of the Huangshan area, though remaining a separate entity. The “Revolutionary Cemetery” notably came to host also some casualties of the Cultural Revolution. The “Soviet Martyrs”, however, remained in the inner-city “Culture Park” area until 2007 and thus were not integrated with the Chinese “martyrs”. This shows that the fact that they were foreigners was more important than “the cause” for which they had died. It also suggests the Chinese authorities were careful when it came to foreign relations implications. In 1966 with the Cultural Revolution and the general push for cremation (and assault on “feudal superstition” in burial practices which had started in the 1950s but now was enforced), interments but for foreigners and Muslims was officially stopped altogether. And later in 1974, even those already buried (but for the foreigners and Muslims) were ordered to be exhumed and the remains cremated.

Back in 1958 at the time of the Great Leap Forward and its revolutionary pitch when cities were supposed to show how they complied with “positive” targets and eliminated certain “negative” things like inner-city cemeteries, all interments not in the two big cemeteries far outside the City (Huangshan to the East and Jinshanbai to the West) had to be stopped, and in the Huangshan cemetery a zoning plan reserved an extra space for the foreigners, subdivided between “emigrants” of Russia (and further nations), and the Jews (who were to a substantial

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98 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 163. It should be noted that the “martyrs” of the Cultural Revolution time are called “so-called martyrs” by this official source itself, taking therewith its distances from the appellation. Before the transfer to the new location, all dead in the “Revolutionary Cemetery” were cremated to comply with the new rules of mandatory cremation.
100 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 45.
101 This campaign of the “four changes” and “eight eliminations” as a background is often overlooked in the discussion of tomb transfer. This was in a way taken further by post-Cultural Revolution policies of enforced cremation which set targets for local governments for becoming “tomb-less” areas. Cf. Haerbinshi Nangangqu minzhengju 哈尔滨市南岗区民政局 (ed.): Nangangqu minzhengzhi 1945-1990 南岗区民政志 1945-1990 (Nangang district civic policy gazetteer 1945-1990), Harbin (internal publication) 1991, p. 118.
102 The Jinshanbai cemetery was closed in 1966. See Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 63. Only the Huangshan Cemetery continued to receive earth burials, though restricted to Muslims and foreigners by then.
part Russian). As mentioned before, also the Koreans were given a section\textsuperscript{103} as were the Muslims,\textsuperscript{104} Catholics and Protestants.\textsuperscript{105} Also the minorities, i.e. the Manchus, Mongols etc. were assigned a special area.\textsuperscript{106}

This zoning strategy shows a strange mixture of criteria to subdivide between religious affiliation and ethnicity (with apparently the goal in mind to put those together of whom a similar burial custom could be assumed). In fact it seems the responsible group for the transfer from Harbin’s Nangang 南岗 district from where all those foreigners’ tombs were moved, was puzzled about the faith-specific burials crisscrossing nationalities and asked for advice from a Soviet professor.\textsuperscript{107} Probably due to the influence of the Soviets, the local Orthodox Church, which had become “autonomous” in 1956 on Chinese government directives with the formal approval of the Moscow patriarchate, was at this point in time still allowed to construct a wooden chapel in the Huangshan cemetery’s respective “emigrants” (mainly Orthodox) section.\textsuperscript{108} This would be destroyed in 1966 with the Cultural Revolution (as were most tomb steles),\textsuperscript{109} and only replaced with a new one in 1995. It was also seemingly due to Soviet interference that collective memorials put up for the Russo-Japanese War dead in the former inner-city cemeteries, basically an anathema for the Chinese who judged this war as “imperialist” from both sides, were

\textsuperscript{103} The Korean section was neighboring the Orthodox. See the map of the Orthodox Cemetery in Huangshan drawn by Mr. Sergey Eryomin who kindly shared his original with me, on the basis of which the map put up at the Orthodox Cemetery in Huangshan is based (where the Korean section is not shown). It is not mentioned either explicitly in the overall map of the Huangshan Cemetery put up in the entrance building of the cemetery where only the Jewish, the Orthodox and the Soviet ones are named. The Heilongjiang provincial gazetteer volume on Foreign Affairs states that the Korean tombs were levelled early on, though not disclosing when and why. (Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 183.) The newly set-up (and at the time of writing still work-in-progress) website of the Russian Cultural Center in Beijing on Russian cemeteries has an updated version of the map provided by Mr. Eryomin, showing the plans for developing the site, naming again the Korean one: available online: http://russianculture.cn/ru/pravoslavnoe-kladbishhe-huanshan-g-harbin/.

\textsuperscript{104} It should be noted that the term used is huimin 回民. This might mean only “Sino-Muslims” (to use the term argued for by Jonathan Lipman) and not necessarily all sorts of Islamic believers. Most “foreign” Muslims were, historically speaking, the “Tartars” from Russia. An early Sino-Muslim cemetery was, by the way, already levelled in 1918 in the Daowai district by the local warlord governing this “Chinese” section of the city, putting up a stele of collective remembrance instead. See Bainian Daowai vol. 1 (2005) pp. 43-44.

\textsuperscript{105} Here, too, it seems the “Catholics” and “Protestants” intended might mean Chinese believers of the by-now “autonomous” Chinese churches. At least some probably Catholic Poles can be found today in the “Orthodox” section (see below), which, however, also is used for Chinese Orthodox believers. Thus, the differentiation between ethnicity and creed is not too sharp.

\textsuperscript{106} Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{107} Wang Huiying (1996), pp. 85-86.

\textsuperscript{108} According to the Daoli district gazetteer, this was de facto a reconstruction of a chapel removed from this inner-city area of the former railway zone: Haerbinshi Daoliu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 哈尔滨市道里区地方志编纂委员会: Daoliu zhi 道里区志 (Daoli district gazetteer), Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 1993, p. 626.

\textsuperscript{109} Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 68. See also the Russian work of Kradin, focusing on architecture, translated into Chinese: N. P. Kelajin (2007), preface p. 3.
preserved and moved to Huangshan, though reframed by the Soviets (see below). The churches connected to the former inner-city cemeteries remained, however, in place.

As it seems, when the issue of transfer arose in 1958, only a minority of 156 Orthodox had applied in the end for (costly) transfer. The more likely were the ones with family still around, those buried only very recently or being of particular importance to the foreign community in Harbin, though the real figure of transferred tombs might be higher than the application numbers suggest. The others were already deep buried (i.e. more than 2 meters beneath surface) and thus remained with the tombstones levelled. (The latter were at times used to reinforce the Sungari River embankment.) Thus, at least according to Chinese statistics, the major group to be actually transferred was 853 Jews. Further foreigners transferred only amounted to 28, but the levelled tombs in 1958 totaled over 23,000. This means that only a tiny portion, which in time would be further reduced, opted for transfer. This was partly due to the fact that many émigrés had left (or had been made to leave) by the time, but also to the short-term deadline between the announcement in early May and the initially set transfer date by end of June 1958.

It should be also noted that the reason given in the announcement was

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111 While the “Ukrainian” church next to the “old” Orthodox cemetery is today active again, the church of the “new” cemetery in the Culture Park remains closed. Both (including the belfry), however, are now labelled protected architectural heritage.
112 Harbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 87. Other sources count 154 Orthodox tombs. For a more personal account and some photos of the cemeteries in the early 1950s and thus rather shortly before the transfer, see the émigré cited in He Ying (2010), pp. 184-187, who also mentions the different non-Orthodox cemeteries in the Culture Park area and their rough location.
113 Of the earlier notables, e.g., the well-known physician Kazem-Bek (1892-1931) might be mentioned [cf. ill. 25]. The restoration of his tomb was one of the major projects of the Russian Club in Harbin together with former Russian “Harbiners” now overseas in the last years. See Sergey Eryomin: “Zabytye mogily?...” (Forgotten graves?...), July 29, 2015(a). Available online: http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-6505.
114 Eryomin (2015a) states that cases of old photos taken after the transfer show that there were tombs with wooden crosses (and thus without durable tombstones while the crosses might have rotten in the meantime) in the Huangshan Orthodox cemetery which, in fact, at present has several unidentified mounds and parts overgrown. He presents a list of 459 names (which of course include also burials after the transfer). Available online: http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-6505. This suggests there might have been more transfers than the 156 given in Chinese sources. The newly set-up (still work-in-progress) website of Beijing’s Russian Cultural Center even claims 1,200 tombs that were initially transferred with over 650 tombs as of today! (Available online: http://russianculture.cn/ru/pravoslavnoe-kladbishhe-huanshan-g-harbin/). The basis of this claim is, however, not provided.
115 The local authorities, however, drew up a map of the names and location, just in case. See Wang Huiying (1996), p. 89.
117 See Wang Huiying (1996), p. 91. (Since the figures are similar in the various gazetteers of Harbin and also cited by scholars who had access to the archives, it may be assumed this is based on archival material.)
118 The announcement was placed in the local newspaper Haerbin ribao 哈尔滨日报 (Harbin Daily) on May 7 (page 4), repeated May 8 (page 2) and May 9 (page 4), with the deadline as of end of June. This, however, was not different from the practice for Chinese tombs when they needed to be transferred, though in this case relatives were more likely to be at hand. (For the Chinese tomb relocations, cf. the new publication by Thomas Mullaney: “No room for the dead: on grave relocation in contemporary China”. In: Thomas Mullaney (ed.): The Chinese
conformity with the “eight not haves” for cities and the acquisition of the status of “hygienic city” alongside city development which required a removal of all inner-city cemeteries, explicitly including the foreign ones (to the apparent, though not mentioned, exclusion of the “Soviet Martyrs”). As the announcement stated bluntly, “all tombs must be transferred by the tomb owners on their own responsibility to the Huangshan zuizi cemetery before end of June, 1958; those not transferred by that time will be treated as owner-less tombs and will be deep buried by the government on spot.”

Although the Orthodox Church in Harbin had tried to prevent the transferal in 1958 in alliance with all other foreign faith groups still active, arguing on religious grounds but also that the dead were already buried deep enough to not pose a hygienic problem, adding that some of them even had been important to Harbin’s history, the Soviets had approved it and put up no resistance when the Chinese – in a typical “revolutionary” fashion – “corrected” the “wrong views” of the foreigners. Because of the protests by the religious communities of foreigners, the deadline was extended, but given the scattered families, in most cases even registration was not very realistic – and not encouraged either.

As archival material cited in Chinese sources reveal, the local government used various measures to push through the decision: beyond the “help” of the Soviet consulate, the “educative” ideological work to “convince” the émigrés and the “model transfer” of the Orthodox clergies’ tombs from St. Nikolay (see below), it enlisted also local Orthodox Chinese to help with procedures, but on the other hand also intimidated those “obstinate” by taking the person who had gathered signatures for a petition against the transfer into police custody. On the positive side, the agreement to have the Orthodox set up a prayer hall, a facility for washing the bodies and for a caretaker along with some payment for the wall of the prior cemetery can be seen as measures to placate the Orthodox community, which at least had the Soviets to rely on, for the loss of the former site, and also the Jewish community which had the most to lose by the transfer.

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120 As mentioned, most missionaries from Western countries had left by then. The more sizeable groups beyond the Orthodox who acted as spokespersons due to their connection to the Soviet consulate were the Jews, and Catholic Poles.

121 This assertion was taken by the Chinese Communist authorities with apparent contempt at the time.

122 Cf. Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Luan Junbo 栾钧博: “Eluosi dongzhengjiao de siwang guannian yu Haerbin dongzhengjiao muyuan bianqian” 俄罗斯东正教的死亡观念与哈尔滨东正教墓园变迁 (“The Russian Orthodox Death Concept and the Changes of Harbin Orthodox Church Cemetery”). In: *Haerbin xueyuan xuebao* 哈尔滨学院学报 (“Journal of Harbin University”) 2018 no. 4, pp. 117-122. There p. 120.
from its large and well-kept former site, was given compensation. Still, even the Chinese sources admit that the large majority of foreign tombs “with owners” were not transferred because the “owners” did not register or refused the transfer outright. Seen that way, the different measures taken had obviously failed with the émigrés. The “Culture Park” in the end was built covering the large areas of the Buddhist Jilesi, Jewish, Polish (intending Catholic) and Orthodox (i.e. the “new”) cemeteries of before. The other cemetery sections aside of them, namely of the “united” one, are now covered by sport facilities next to the “Culture Park”.

Now, as to what resulted from the transfer, we may first take a look at the Jewish cemetery [ill. 2], since in Chinese perspective, this was the somewhat more “successful” transfer case, making up the main group of those applying for transfer to Huangshan from the former “Culture Park” location. Apparently, after the transfer which started in 1958 (and according to Qu and Li ended only in 1961), very few new burials were done directly in Huangshan subsequently. Still, although the Jewish community in Harbin was dissolved in 1963, the last Jewish lady who died in Harbin, a “Russian”, was interred in Huangshan only in 1985: Hana Agre. Strange to say, she has been claimed dead since 1964 by both Israeli-Jewish and local Chinese official sources in spite of her having been interviewed by first-rate Western media in the 1980s! However, her tomb seems to have disappeared – or is elsewhere than in the Jewish Cemetery section. This means that burials in the Jewish Cemetery stopped in the early 1960s, the latest seemingly being Boris A. Nemik of September 24, 1963, and the cemetery thus is now a “historical” one. Of the three Huangshan Cemetery sections involving foreigners, the Jewish is the only one that has received some more in-depth scholarly attention to this point.

125 According to a 1983 report, she stated she was officially “stateless” but holding a “Moscow passport” and of a family that had migrated in tsarist times to Harbin. Cf. Christopher S. Wren: „A Jewish Legacy Draws to a Close in North China“. In: The New York Times, February 27, 1983.
126 Qu and Li (2013), p. 434.
127 The possibly last report on a personal encounter appeared on August 11, 1985, in the New York Times (John Burns: “Russian legacy fades in North China”). The “Jews of China” website and other media still claim to this day she was dead since 1964, and even more strangely, on the Harbin government’s website (http://www.hrbfao.gov.cn/sjjyhrbr/yjdetail.jsp?urltype=news.NewsContentUrl&wbtreeid=1627&wbnewsid=4966) this claim (obviously stemming from the Israeli side) is translated into Chinese without comment or correction.
128 It neither figures in the table of Qu and Li (2013) on the location of tombs in the Jewish Cemetery (appendix IV) nor on the ZEGK website dedicated to this cemetery (http://www.zegk.uni-heidelberg.de/hist/ausstellungen/harbin/Harbin_Lageplan_New_Cemetery.htm) nor on the “Find a Grave” website (see below). Also at a personal visit I did not come across it. (I am grateful to a local scholar for help with getting access to the cemetery.)
129 See the “Find a Grave” website for a photo of the tombstone: (https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/141840919/boris-abramovich-nemik).
130 For some broader afterthoughts on the Jewish cemetery in Harbin as a reflection of “the tensions between transboundary lives and territorialized dead”, see the article by Swiss historian and leader of the ZEGK project, Madeleine Herren: “The Globalization of Death: Foreign Cemeteries in a Transnational Perspective”. In: Dan Ben-
The spatial arrangement of the Jewish cemetery already when at “Culture Park” reflected some hierarchy: thus, the rabbi was centrally placed, and also the “important” families close to him.\textsuperscript{131} Although the books of the Jewish association counted 3.173 Jewish interments between 1903 and 1958,\textsuperscript{132} there are only some 500 in Huangshan today.\textsuperscript{133} According to Chinese sources of the time of transfer, there were over 800 tombs moved, though not all with tombstones. In fact, today one finds several plaques where there are no preserved tombstones that have been probably installed during restorations according to name lists, though spellings vary [ill. 3, 4].\textsuperscript{134} Thus, it is open to question as to what happened to the missing ones, though it is highly probable that the time of the Cultural Revolution also meant to the Jewish cemetery (as for the rest of Huangshan cemetery) not only neglect, but large-scale destruction [ill. 5, 6].\textsuperscript{135} On the other hand, a present Israeli sojourner (whose voice might influence foreign, namely Jewish, perceptions) has raised doubts as to whether during the transfer maybe only tombstones have been transferred without any human remains, since in one specific case when a tomb of a couple needed restoration, no

\textsuperscript{131} Zhang Tiejiang (2017), p. 275. For a rare glimpse into the spatial arrangement in the pre-transfer situation, see the obviously archival map of the “old” Jewish cemetery (with Russian inscription of 1959) reproduced on the illustration sheets in Zhang Tiejiang 张铁江: Jiekai Haerbin youtairen lishi zhi ni. Haerbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2005.

\textsuperscript{132} Zhang Tiejiang (2017), p. 274.

\textsuperscript{133} According to Li Fangbin (2005: pp. 272-273 and pp. 276-277), the former manager of the Huangshan cemetery, in late 2000 a database of the Jewish Cemetery had been set up (www.hrjewcemery.com [sic!]) with the 583 tombs individuated (of 605) and photos of each tombstone, which however cannot be found any longer on the web. The existing references for the cemetery are at variance with each other: see, e.g., the ZEGK database which was done by fieldwork and use of Russian and Hebrew sources (identifying 450 gravestones); the Chinese local research which is reflected in the table in the Qu/Li dictionary (2013), appendix, which provides the names and locations in Chinese, English and Russian versions (583 tombs claimed still extant); and the popular “Find a Grave” website (880 entries, though only partly still extant) (https://www.findagrave.com/cemetery/2511803/harbin-jewish-cemetery). See also the online list of graves on the “Jews of China” website providing 515 names (http://www.jewsofchina.org/harbin-sites). The ZEGK and the “Find a Grave” websites provide some present-day photos.

\textsuperscript{134} Comparing the photos on the ZEGK and the “Find a Grave” websites (and my own photos), it seems that the Chinese table in Qu and Li (2013) in case of doubt gives names according to written sources. E.g., location 3-9 is given as “Yankel Zantliafier” (obvious misprint in English aside other Zantliaufer: the Russian and Chinese versions are identical), whereas the on-spot plaque [cf. ill. 4] shows “Zantlaz Yankel”. The ZEGK database provides the photo of this plaque but nevertheless has “Yankel Zantlaufer” in its location table.

\textsuperscript{135} The gazetteers also hint at this. See, e.g., the Foreign Affairs volume of the Heilongjiang provincial gazetteer: Heilongjiang shengzhi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi (1993), p. 186. This account is taken up in almost all later Chinese treatments of the subject. See, e.g., Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Li Yunfeng 吕韫风: “Haerbin youtairen mudi bianqian jiqi xiandai yiyi” 哈尔滨犹太人墓地变迁及其现代意义 (The trajectory and present significance of the Harbin Jewish cemetery). In: Heilongjiang shenhui kexue (Heilongjiang Social Sciences) 2009, no. 5, pp. 133-136. (A reworked version of this article can be found in Wang Zhijun 王志军 and Li Wei 李薇: 20 shiji shanghanqi Haerbin youtairen de zongjiao shenghuo yu zhengzhi shenghuo 20世纪上半期哈尔滨犹太人的宗教生活与政治生活 (“Harbin Jews in Early 1900’s: Their Political and Religious Lives”), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2013, chapter 2.4.) Li Fangbin, the former manager of the cemetery, only vaguely hints at the possibility of the tombstones having been damaged not just by chance or nature. (Li Fangbin 2005: p. 272 and p. 276).
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coffins or bones were found beneath the tombstone.\textsuperscript{136} This general assertion, however, is strongly denied from the Chinese side.\textsuperscript{137} He also raised doubts as to the spatial arrangement at Huangshan being done without Jewish participation – contrary to claims during the transfer – as the direction of tombstones does not conform to Jewish practice. However, at the time of the transfer a small Jewish community was still in place to observe the whole, and one should consider the possibility that the present state does not need to go back to the transfer but might well be due to the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent “restorations” which are also mentioned in Chinese sources. The assumption that nothing happened to the Jewish cemetery in Huangshan during the Cultural Revolution (when it did to the neighboring Orthodox one, but also the Chinese parts of the cemetery), figuring so many Jewish “bourgeois” tombs [ill. 7, 8] is more than unlikely: and post-Cultural Revolution “restorations” often meant a “tidying up” above ground which might well have changed individual tombstone location and orientation. At least elsewhere in the PRC there was some documented preoccupation with the transfer of human remains, and the “new” outlook above ground came rather during “restorations” after the Cultural Revolution destructions.\textsuperscript{138}

In any case, at the time of transfer the Jewish association was still present in Harbin, and thus they managed to argue for recompense for the wall and buildings they had had at the former location which was substantially larger than the space actually used. Thus, the Huangshan location for the Jews was fenced-in again and space was abundant – which probably enticed later cuts into the space when the Jewish association had ceased to exist in the city and burial space

\textsuperscript{136} See Ben-Canaan’s comments on the case of the 2008 restoration of the tombs of the Ifland couple (location: 44_13 and 44_14). Cf. Dan Ben-Canaan: “A Continuing Quest for a Peaceful Resting Place: The Relocating Process of the Harbin Jewish Cemetery to Huangshan”. In: Ber Boris Kotlerman (ed.): \textit{Mizrekh: Jewish Studies in the Far East} vol. 2, 2010, pp. 135-159, there p. 141-143. The author is an Israeli journalist, now professor, living in Harbin since years. The information gathered in his article from local archival sources (translated by Chinese research assistants) confirms that the Chinese descriptions by Zhang Tiejiaing, e.g., and by the various gazetteers largely are based on them. Ben-Canaan, though obviously not reading Chinese himself, adds some interesting details by his own observation as a sojourner in Harbin since many years.

\textsuperscript{137} Ben-Canaan’s assertion literally enraged the local Chinese scholars working on the cemetery, as I had the occasion to witness.

\textsuperscript{138} Cf. Müller (2018a) for the relatively well documented case in Shanghai with foreigners’ tombs in the “Song Qingling Memorial Garden”.
for others was urgently needed [ill. 9]. A major renovation of the site was undertaken in the late 1990s, according to the manager of the cemetery at the time.

Although the Jewish cemetery is now historical and relatively well publicized for foreign relations, it is nevertheless striking, when having a closer look, as to how it is “preserved”: since the former prime minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, has a grandfather there, the tomb (which he visited in 2004 and 2009) is – unsurprisingly – well looked after [ill. 10], and Olmert’s thanks to the people of Harbin for caring is engraved on an obelisk at the entrance [ill. 11]. Also the tombs of the Kaufman family who were and are a pillar of Sino-Israeli connections via Harbin, are renewed and neat. However, the “spiritual leader” of the Jews of Harbin at the time was Ukrainian Rabbi Aron Moshe Kiselev who served the community from 1913 to his death in 1949 and who was buried centrally, as mentioned, in the Jewish cemetery when still at the “Culture Park” location. When checking now for the tomb of the “chief rabbi of all East Asia” in present-day materials on the cemetery, one finds him on the tables simply as “Aron Kiselev” (location 23-1). Although the tomb is visually impressive with its niche and colored

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139 For the cuts in space, cf. the illustration sheets in Zhang Tiejiang (2005) on the same page with the “old map” where there is also a map of the present-day Huangshan Jewish Cemetery as designed by the urban city planning bureau. This new map is unfortunately not dated, but since it uses the characters 建 for Huangshan, it must be at least after the mid-1990s (and obviously before 2005, the year of the publication of this book it is in). The way it is designed also suggests that at the time the earlier more abundant space of the cemetery was to be reduced. According to Dan Ben-Canaan’s statement who resides in Harbin since 2002 that the present fence was set up after the first visit of Olmert in 2004 (cf. Dan Ben-Canaan (2010), p. 142), this map might then be of that time to suggest the new fence, i.e. of 2004-2005.


141 It was by Chinese media reports in the year 2000 when the Xinhua News Agency reported intensively on the special care of Harbin for the Jewish cemetery that worldwide attention was created. See Bainian Daowai: Haerbin de nianlun cong sheli yanshen (100 years Daowai [district]: Harbin’s annual rings extend from here, vol. 1), Harbin: n.p. 2005, p. 39. The paper of the Huangshan Cemetery’s manager at the time, Li Fangbin, at the International Seminar on the history and culture of Jews in Harbin in 2004 also made perfectly clear that the cemetery is to be used to further Sino-Israeli relations and to attract Jewish tourists from all over the world. Beyond Olmert, also former Israeli premier Rabin is said to have relatives there. (See Li Fangbin 2005, pp. 274-275 and pp. 278-280).

142 See the dictionary of Qu/Li (2013), p. 123-124.

143 At present, a black marble tombstone is in place. For a photo of the earlier state of the tomb, see Acheng: He shangdi yiqi liulang: Youtairen Haerbin binanji (The Jews in Harbin, lit.: Wandering with God: record of the Jews seeking refuge in Harbin), Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe 2008, p. 248.


145 Chernolutskaya (2000), p. 82, calls him the “chief rabbi of all East Asia”. Puzzlingly, the photo provided in the ZEGK database has metadata there that seem to belong to location 23-3 (and for 23-3 the one of 23-4 and further inconsistencies between location tables and photos) and seems to not have grasped the special importance of this figure.
Star of David and its purely Hebrew inscription [ill. 12], it seems this low-key treatment of the religiously central figure is on purpose. This is corroborated by the fact that although the rabbi’s descendants were received when they wanted to look after the tomb in 2004, he is nevertheless not included in the Chinese enumeration of “famous people” interred in the Jewish cemetery. Those rather include merchants and businessmen, starting with the “first Jew” to settle in Harbin in 1899, Grigory B. Drizin from Russia, who died there after 50 years in 1949 at the notable old age of 103 years (tomb location: 22-05), or successful entrepreneurs. One may also note that at the time of transfer, the Jewish association had asked the religious authorities in Moscow and Israel about the procedures. Both agreed to the transfer, but from the side of Israel (which, as might be reminded, at the time had no diplomatic relations with the PRC) there was the request to transfer the remains of Rabbi Kiselev and his family to Israel. This, as it seems, was not granted.

While the transfer and set-up in Huangshan of the by now “historical” case of the Jewish Cemetery could be largely arranged to the satisfaction of the Chinese authorities, things were much more difficult with the Orthodox [ill. 13, 14] who had strongly opposed the transfer from the start. The Chinese authorities thus tried to “convince” this group more specifically to accept the move by starting the transfer with 5 tombs of clerics buried at the St. Nikolay Cathedral, above all the first Bishop of Harbin and Metropolitan, Methodius/Mefody (Gerasimov), who had died in 1931. His tomb, however, cannot be found there today, neither any other of clerics of that earlier time. Thus, it is not clear as to what happened to them. Methodius’ successor, Meletius/Melety (Zaborovsky), who died in 1946, in any case was not included as he had not been buried at the Cathedral but at the Holy Annunciation Church, the largest church of all the orthodox churches built in Harbin in its final version, which was closed in 1958, i.e. at the time of transfer, and finally demolished during the Cultural Revolution. In Chinese eyes, he was a

147 I am grateful to Michelle Amar for help with the Hebrew inscription.
148 For a photo of the rabbi’s descendants in front of the tomb, see Qu Wei 曲伟 et al.: Dongfang Nuoya fangzhou: Youtairen zai Zhongguo Haerbin lishi wenhua yanjiu,东方诺亚方舟。犹太人在中国哈尔滨历史文化研究 vol. 1 (“The Oriental Noah’s Ark – On the History and Culture of Jews in Harbin”) [note: the Chinese original title has “in Chinese Harbin”], Harbin: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe and Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe 2014, illustration sheet on various international visits to the cemetery in the 2000s, not the least from Western countries. For the mentioning of the 2004 visit of Rabbi Kiselev’s relatives, see his biography in the Qu/Li dictionary (2013), p. 233.
151 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), p. 87. Cf. also Haerbinshi Nangangu minzhengju (1991), p. 131. (The same description is repeated also in other gazetteers and thus probably based on archival material, although the gazetteers only rarely mention the archival documents explicitly.) See for a short biography of Methodius/Mefody: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/methodiusgerasimov_en.htm.
152 It is not clear from the Chinese sources who were the other 4 clerics beyond Methodius intended. Eryomin’s (2015a) preliminary name list does not include Methodius/Mefody either.
153 According to Father Pozdnyaev, the remains of Meletius have been profaned when the Annunciation church (also called Blagoveshchensk) was closed in 1958 which means he obviously was not transferred. Dionisy Pozdnyaev:
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problematic figure anyway since he was head of the diocese during the Manchukuo/Japanese-controlled era. Some Russian clerics who died between 1958 and 1962, however, can still be found [ill. 15], apparently the last being Father Baryshnikov who died in 1962. These clerics were thus likely buried directly in Huangshan. It might be noted that Father Baryshnikov’s tombstone has been inscribed on the back with the unique and stone” in consideration of “his good deeds” “since he was very helpful in life to the people” [ill. 16, 17]. In another case, the tomb of a Russian priest was “covered” by a “wrongly placed” tombstone [ill. 18]. In Orthodox circles stories of elder Russians who lived through the Cultural Revolution locally are transmitted about widespread vandalism of the Orthodox tombs, most of them of “normal” believers, during that period [ill. 19]. It should be recalled that in 1962 the Sino-Soviet split had already led to the closure of the Soviet consulate in Harbin and thus to the end of any potential care (or at least monitoring) from that side. In terms of clerics, some tombs of later “indigenous” priests of Harbin are there today, to the notable exclusion of archpriest Wang Yulin 王玉林 who had been made head of the local “autonomous” Orthodox Church of China, served as the last head of the St. Nikolay Cathedral, was persecuted and died in the early days of the Cultural Revolution in 1967. To be found at present are, however: Archpriest He Hailin 何海林 [ill. 20], the apparently only one who died before the transfer (in 1956, having served at the Holy Annunciation church) and thus was apparently moved, Archpriest Wu Zhiquan 吴志全 (of Manchu origin) who was tortured and died during the Cultural Revolution in 1970 [ill. 21], and the most recent one of priest Zhu Shipu 朱世朴 [ill. 22] (of Manchu origin as well) who had revived services after the Cultural Revolution for the


He was accused of having collaborated with the Japanese, although he finally clashed with them over the issue of State Shintô. Cf. the comments from the Orthodox side by N. P. Razzhigaeva against the collaboration accuse as voiced, e.g., by Harbin scholar Li Shuxiao: “Tragic destiny of the Blagoveshchensk temple in Harbin”. Available online: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/harbin/tragicfateannunciation_en.htm.

This, at least, is stated by the explanatory plaque put up 2018 at the cemetery for the tomb of priest Mikhail Avsenev who died in 1959 on whose tomb a tombstone for a young woman who had died in 1932 was found, though not stating whether this was done as a safety measure or due to other reasons. Apart from priests, there are at least also two Russian former heads of the Kazan monastery in Harbin: monks Ignaty [ill. 15] and Serafim who both died shortly one after the other in 1958. (For some personal memories of “old Harbiners” of them, see: http://st-nicholas.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134:kharbinskij-starets-skhiigumen-ignatij&catid=13&Itemid=110.)

The last Russian cleric had left just before the Cultural Revolution, in 1966. See Lomanov (2010), p. 832.


few remaining Russians and the Chinese Orthodox, often of Sino-Russian descent [ill. 23, 24], and who died of age in 2000. He was at the time the last Orthodox priest in Harbin, and thus he himself had to receive a lay funeral, since the authorities declined to invite a priest “from outside”. It was only in 2016 when a young Chinese orthodox priest (Yu Shi 遇石) took over again in Harbin, who is now also caring for the cemetery.

Again in contrast to the Jewish Cemetery which is purely historical and less “problematic” for boosting its potential in international relations, with the Orthodox cemetery things are different, since the cemetery not only hosts historical figures, “positive” or “problematic” [ill. 25, 26], but is still in use, now providing burial space for mainly Chinese Orthodox [ill. 27]. One may note that the Funerary Regulations displayed at the Huangshan Cemetery and signed as of 1998 by the Chinese Orthodox Church (which is, as mentioned, “autonomous” since 1956 as is required of all Christian Churches in the PRC), specify that earth burial is open only to minorities and foreign and “stateless” Orthodox (paragraph 11), suggesting that Chinese Orthodox should rather comply with the general “Chinese” rule of cremation. (In 1993, the municipal regulations had still shown some consideration of the general Orthodox rejection of cremation, explicitly exempting the Chinese Orthodox clerics – but only them – from the obligatory cremation.)

More historically, a further notable feature of the Orthodox Cemetery in Huangshan is the integration of the memorials to the Russian soldiers who died during the Russo-Japanese War.

160 Tang Ge (2010), p. 141, stresses that the Chinese Orthodox he encountered were mainly of “mixed blood”, intending usually Russian mothers and Chinese fathers (or one generation further down). As it seems, most “pure” Russians never learned Chinese well, whereas the Chinese Orthodox did not speak Russian, thus dividing the parish de facto in two language groups with only sporadic interaction.
162 For a brief video on his ordination in Russia, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TCKxzzkjMTk.
163 For a brief reflection on this history from the Chinese side, see local writer Acheng in his Haerbinren (2014), pp. 261-264, and his longer work He shangdi… (2008), where he mentions the foreign cemeteries several times.
164 The table put up by the “Community of the Orthodox Church of Intercession” (i.e. the one-time “Ukrainian” church now serving as the church of the Orthodox parish) of June 10, 2018, points out some notable figures in the cemetery. The most recent non-Chinese was buried in 2006 at the very old age of 96: Efrosinya Andreevna Nikiforova. Another (less aged) one, Vladimir Alekseevich Zinchenko who died in 2002, had been interviewed by John Burns of the New York Times in 1985 (Burns: “Russian legacy…”). Others are named on Orthodox websites, e.g. http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/harbin/20060317cemetery_en.htm. One of the fairly recent newly documented cases are the Soviet students of the Harbin Polytechnical Institute who died in 1946 during local violence and belonged to those transferred. Sergey Gribin: “Pyat’ fotografy - pyat’ korotkikh sudeb” (Five photos - five short fates). Available online: http://www.unification.com.au/articles/read/2588/. Apparently, being neither soldiers nor (later) advisors, they were not admitted to the “Soviet” cemetery but at the time were buried in the orthodox one and from there transferred to Huangshan.
165 Haerbinshi minzhengju (1999), appendix, p. 117. Given the lack of clerics beyond Fr. Zhu Shipu at the time, this was rather an on-principle declaration, though.
1904/05. The commemoration of these casualties had been a common part of any Russian remembrance of the dead in Harbin in pre-PRC times.\(^{166}\) Since that war is regarded by the Chinese as fought by two imperialists on Chinese soil, a commemoration of the Russian soldiers was out of question to the local Chinese. It was therefore only possible to commemorate them in the context of their (predominantly) Orthodox affiliation, and thus the military memorials, when transferred, were grouped with the other Orthodox tombs,\(^{167}\) and not with the “military successors” of the Soviet Army casualties. Whereas one large memorial is a generic one for the Russian soldiers of the Russo-Japanese War who died from their wounds in Harbin’s hospitals [ill. 28], another is an individual one for Captain Aleksandr Kornil’ev (1864-1904), a high-ranking naval officer who died of tuberculosis in Harbin after having commanded a Russian destroyer at Port Arthur (Lüshun) in early skirmishes with the Japanese [ill. 29]. The two monuments had been transferred to Huangshan in 1958 but underwent notable changes, likely due to Soviet interference, “crowning” them at this point with a Soviet red star, and receiving “new” inscriptions in “modern” Russian to put praise on their “loyalty to the motherland”, by this smoothing the way for a Soviet “appropriation” (and easing things regarding Chinese sensibilities). The present outlook, though, again without the Soviet star and with re-installed crosses, is due to the recent restoration efforts of the local Russian Club in 2011.\(^{168}\)

Furthermore, the Orthodox Cemetery also covers, beyond Orthodox of other countries than “Russia”,\(^{169}\) also some Catholic Poles [ill. 30],\(^{170}\) which means that also some foreign Catholics ended up there: the most notable case is Władysław Kowalski (1870-1940), an outstanding entrepreneur and important figure of the sizable Polish community of Harbin who was very

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\(^{166}\) See, e.g., the description of rites at the inner-city Orthodox cemeteries in pre-PRC times in Rong Jie et al. (2011), p. 75-76.

\(^{167}\) There had been memorials at the “old” and the “new” inner-city Orthodox cemeteries, as well as the commemoration tablets in the Iveron Church of the Amur Army close to the railway station. See, e.g., Rong Jie (2011), p. 76. The two now in the Huangshan Orthodox Cemetery are mostly said to have been transferred from the “old” Orthodox one. See also Wang Zhijun and Luan Junbo (2018), p. 121. A 1992 survey, though, argued only Captain Kornil’ev was transferred from the “old” one, whereas the “collective” memorials were originally 3 and all in the “new” one. (See Haerbingshi renmin zengfu difangzhi bangongshi (1992), p. 144.)


\(^{169}\) Not surprisingly, given the extension of the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union, this included Ukrainians, Belarusians, but also others. A more well-known – if controversial – personality is the Georgian Ivliv Khaindrava who was a leading figure in the Georgian community at good terms with the Japanese/Manchuko side (and less so with the Russians). See on him, e.g., Hiroaki Kuromiya and Georges Mamoulia: The Eurasian Triangle: Russia, The Caucasus and Japan, 1904–1945, Berlin and Warsaw: de Gruyter Open, 2016, p. 66 and p. 104.

\(^{170}\) The Polish authorities list nine Poles buried in the Huangshan Orthodox Cemetery. See the report of November 2, 2012, on the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consular Information website, reporting the activities to honor the dead in Harbin on All Saints’ Day, available online: https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polonia/wydarzenia/azja/chiny__obchody_dnia_wszystkich_swietych. Their tombs usually figure a “Latin” cross.
active in building Catholic Churches there. It should, of course, also be noted, that the Poles – as the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians – were “socialist” at the time of transfer, i.e. the dead of post-war “politically friendly” parts of the world (in Chinese perspective) were those more likely to be transferred in 1958 to Huangshan. Russian Orthodox visitors in 2006, though, noted that comparing to the by then well cared-for Jewish cemetery, the Orthodox one was dilapidating. Probably due to the fact that 2006 was proclaimed the “year of Russia in China”, the Harbin government gave money to at least reconstruct the main gate and the fence.

The Soviet Cemetery [ill. 31], in turn, was decided to be moved apparently in the context of this “year of Russia in China” and the immediately following “year of China in Russia” in 2007. As stated, the Soviet Cemetery had remained in the “Culture Park” area until that time, and it was the last foreign “addendum” to Huangshan. Visitors to the earlier site in the 1980s at a time when relations between China and the Soviet Union were only starting to warm up, noted the complete neglect of it. According to Aleksandr Kirilllin, the responsible for the memorialization of Russian soldiers fallen “in the defense of the fatherland” from the side of the Russian Ministry of Defense who had led the fact-finding tour in 2004 to China, negotiations with the Chinese were more complicated than with other countries since there was no way of mutuality, given the absence of Chinese military tombs in Russia. Still, by April of 2007 the Sino-Russian agreement was signed with a Chinese promise to care for Soviet soldiers’ tombs and memorials.


172 The on-spot plaque speaks also of Germans. Sergey Eryomin and others who have set up that plaque are researching into the people interred and plan a publication (personal communication, July 30, 2018). There are already over 580 names they identified. See “Kuda ukhodit russkiy Kharbin: Zhurnalist AP posetil russkoe kladbishche v Kharbine” (Whereto is Russian Harbin headed? The journalist of the AP visited the Russian cemetery in Harbin”. In: Amurskaya Pravda (Amur Truth), September 13, 2012. Available online: https://www.ampravda.ru/2012/09/13/036197.html. (One may note that this figure of 580 in 2012 is far beyond the above-cited list Eryomin published three years later in 2015(a) with 459 names: http://www.russianchina.org/news/2015/07/29/6505#more-6505).


174 For photos of the earlier site, see Ivanov et al. (1997), pp. 177-178. (As mentioned above, Ivanov was a veteran of the 1945 “August Storm”: he had entered Harbin on a tank in 1945 and acted later as vice-head of the Sino-Russian friendship association.)

175 See Burns: “Russian legacy…” (1985) who wrote of 200 tombs which were overgrown almost completely, while the local Russians told him the Orthodox ones had been “taken away”, looting the coffins for gold rings and golden teeth. This, in turn, suggests that the remaining Russians were not all clear about the meanwhile Huangshan location of some of the earlier Orthodox buried.

176 Cf. the interview with him, cited in the Russian daily Kommersant (Businessman), August 30, 2010, p. 6: “Vozvraschcheniye v Port-Artur” (Return to Port Arthur).
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(being less controversial than non-Soviet Russian ones) located on Chinese soil, and this agreement provided the general background also to the transfer in Harbin, where there had been complaints by Russian visitors about the misfit in location of the tombs in the “Culture Park” which hosts an amusement park today. Thus, the transfer to Huangshan was done in just one month, but only reported in the Russian media to some extent, although both the Russian and the Chinese Foreign Ministers attended the opening. While the leading Harbin newspaper did not write about it at all, Beijing’s official Renmin ribao 人民日报 (People’s Daily) only added one sentence while reporting on the meeting between the two Foreign Ministers. According to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, 12,000 Soviet soldiers died, “liberating China”, of whom 104 were now honored in the Soviet Cemetery in Huangshan. The Sino-Russian official list, though, counts 111 “martyrs”, of whom 89 are individuated (put according to rank) and 22 are anonymous. As has been noted in Chinese surveys, it is not quite clear from where the “liberating Soviet martyrs” (as they are called in Chinese vs. the simpler “Soviet Military Cemetery” diction in Russian) of 1945 were transferred at that time, to be then “centrally” buried in Harbin, as there was no fighting in Harbin itself during that period.

Beyond the “martyrs”, there are also some who died after the August 1945 battles, including Soviet specialists of the early 1950s who were transferred to the Huangshan Soviet Cemetery as well. Their tombstones are marked by a different outlook [ill. 32], as is the case with the officers,

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178 This is proudly stated on the on-spot plaque.
179 Since the visit of Lavrov also included the more spectacular news of a triangle meeting with the Foreign Minister of India, most Chinese reports on the Harbin visit concentrated on the latter. The Soviet Cemetery opening thus remained in the shadow.
180 The Haerbin ribao as the main local newspaper only reported on Lavrov’s presence but nothing on the cemetery opening.
183 See the Memorial database of the Russian Ministry of Defense: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=84128872&p=1, which provides as source this Sino-Russian list, finally signed in 2010. The basis of this list is, de facto, Ivanov et al.’s survey of 1996 as published in 1997 in Ivanov et al., pp. 179-181. They had individuated 91 casualties. (For photos of the cemetery in the mid-1990s, i.e. still at the Culture Park location, see also there pp. 177-178).
184 Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 83. As mentioned, Tian notes that most of the larger cemeteries are not where the battles were (often waged in not easily accessible places where later a stele might be put), but the Soviets moved the dead to these cemeteries to bury them centrally. (Tian 2010, p. 21). He complains (p. 174) that the Soviets did not leave any archival material to the Chinese which might also explain why Chinese and Russian descriptions of site details often vary.
while the soldiers have their typical identical tombstones.\textsuperscript{185} Some of these were newly made since the old ones had been in a bad shape.\textsuperscript{186} Soviet-Russian figures appearing on an archival card about the “Culture Park” location list 203 Soviet names of which 110 were individual graves, the other 93 were collectively memorialized with a stele, but the individual graves included also some post-war dead (military staff or not), most notably two women: a female surgeon and a female technician-lieutenant.\textsuperscript{187} At that time, the responsible entities for the cemetery were named as the People’s Government of Harbin Municipality together with the Russian Orthodox Church, and as representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense the Military Attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the PRC. By this naming one may conclude that although the card used was of 1990 and of the USSR Ministry, the time it was filled in must have been after December 1991, i.e. the time the “Russian Federation” had been declared. The website of the present Russian Ministry of Defense now lists 302 names under the burial place “Harbin” which seems, however, to double entries between the 111 and the 203 lists,\textsuperscript{188} again including the non-combatant specialists.\textsuperscript{189} This suggests that from the Russian perspective, the cemetery was seen as for “Soviets” more broadly, whereas the Chinese officially only talk about the “Soviet martyrs” who died “for the liberation of China” by fighting the Japanese (whereas the Russian inscriptions on the central large common stele tellingly honor the “heroes” only for fighting for the USSR without naming the Chinese).

\textsuperscript{185} It may be added that this way of differentiating according to rank also in tombstone outlook was common in military cemeteries before the World Wars. Thereafter a “democratization” of tombstones became more widespread in Western countries, as can be seen, e.g., in the US and British war graves, where only the inscription reveals the specifics. Cf. the example of Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemeteries in Hong Kong in my previous study: Gotelind Müller: \textit{Challenging dead: a look into foreigners’ cemeteries in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan}, Heidelberg and Berlin: CrossAsia-Repository, 2018(b), pp. 16-17 and pp. 42-44. (Available online: DOI: https://doi.org/10.11588/xarep.00004145). The Soviets, though, visually stress the rank.

\textsuperscript{186} See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 109. This book mainly addresses the Lüshun cemetery (see below) but also covers other places of “Soviet martyrs” in China. The possibility that the need to make new tombstones might have been also due to Cultural Revolution period “interventions” is not addressed. According to Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 81, all tombs had originally a photo but these “are now lost” (as can be clearly seen from the empty spaces).

\textsuperscript{187} See the Memorial website of the Russian Ministry of Defense: e.g. https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262076766&pp=5, which gives 203 burials as “known”. The provided source printed on the paper of the predecessor of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR, shows a handwritten correction of 91 to 93 (on its p. 2) of recorded names on the main monument, plus 110 individual tombs, arriving at the total of 203. On the document’s pp. 4-7 some specialists are named. In all, there appear 13 people with some individual date listed, some military staff, some not, who were obviously not falling under the main category of those who died during the battles against the Japanese in 1945 as “martyrs”/”heroes”.

\textsuperscript{188} See https://obd-memorial.ru/html/search.htm?country=T--%D0%9A%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B9%20region=T--%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%A5%20%D0%BD%D0%B9%20%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%BD%D1%8F%20%D0%AF%20%D0%BD%D0%B2%20%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%B0%D0%BD%20%D0%B2&place=T--%D0%BF%20&entities=24,28,27,23,34,22,20,21&pp=16.

\textsuperscript{189} See, e.g., the entry on the “Soviet specialist” Vasily N. Fomin who died in 1954 and seems to be the last one to die of those represented. Available online: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262076888.
In any case, in 2007 all that was still there in the “Culture Park”[^190] was transferred to Huangshan’s “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” (and not to the Orthodox one, e.g., in spite of the Russian Orthodox Church’s role as co-responsible for the Soviet Cemetery), by this, in a sense, continuing the division between the “Whites” and the “Reds” also at the new location, or – seen from a Chinese Communist perspective – keeping the distinction between those “having helped China” (as soldiers or specialists) and “the others”. As the agreement between Russia and the PRC in 2007 had stated, the Chinese were guaranteeing only for the former ones, and – as will be seen in the following – the Chinese were adamant in keeping a clear differentiation between the “Soviet friends” and the “Russian rest”, be it tsarist-imperial, e.g. with the Russo-Japanese War dead, “White” or else, quite to the dismay of the Russians today who see all those dead as “compatriots”.

**Dalian and Lüshun**

Whereas Harbin has been the railway nodal point in the North of Manchuria, Dalian and Lüshun were at the southern end of it, connecting the Siberian land mass via the railway with the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf respectively. Dalian functioned mainly as a civil port, and Lüshun as a naval one. Today, Lüshun or Lushunkou (because of the harbor) is administratively part of Dalian municipality. Before, both were named together “Lü-Da”. The location just opposite the Shandong peninsula made for receiving many migrants from there who either worked in Manchuria temporarily or settled down to stay[^191]. Thus, a substantial part of the Han population in the area and further up in Manchuria is from Shandong. The main administrative center of the southern Liaodong peninsula before the 19th century, though, was slightly further north in Jinzhou, today part of Dalian municipality as well and located at the nearest strip of the Liaodong peninsula between the two coasts.

The protected harbor of Lüshun was used early on for the military, first catching the eyes of foreigners with the British in the mid-19th century to whom it owes its “Western” name “Port Arthur”. The Qing thus realized its military potential as well, and on the suggestion of a German advisor, the influential official Li Hongzhang chose it in the 1880s as a major navy port for the Chinese. In consequence, Lüshun became a focal point during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95.

[^190]: In the early 1990s, the number provided was 110 single tombs of “Soviet martyrs” there. See *Heilongjiang shengzi: di liushijiu juan: waishizhi* (1993), p. 189. As this source also notes (p. 190) with reference to archival material, the tombs were partly damaged during the Cultural Revolution and only a part of them was reconstructed thereafter.

The place became famous in a tragic way when the Japanese finally conquered the walled city and committed a massacre that shocked the world at the time. Although the Japanese claimed the Liaodong peninsula as a war booty in 1895, they were pressured by Russia, Germany and France to return it to the Qing against compensation, the Russians then striking themselves a deal with Li Hongzhang for the setting up of the railway and the lease of the Dalian-Lüshun area (the so-called Kwantung Leased Territory, Guandongzhou 关东州) in 1898. Thus, Dalian (at first called Dal’ny, i.e. “far” in Russian) as a city was a Russian creation, much like Harbin, connected to the building of the railway, but its fate diverged from Harbin already in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 since thereafter the Southern Manchurian Railway, as this end of the railway was called now, remained in the hands of the Japanese. In fact, whereas Harbin was built up by the Russians, in Dalian in spite of large initial investment, time for actual building was simply short, and thus much of the Russian plans were realized only under the Japanese who happily used the Russian plans they had captured during the war.

Lüshun as the crucial naval port had not only borne the brunt in the area during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95, but fared also much worse than the newly founded Dal’ny during the Russo-Japanese war 1904/05, at least (though not exclusively) in perspective of the Russians there: the Russian navy anchored in “their” harbor, but when the Japanese repeatedly blocked the entrance and – after a long siege – attacked from the landside rear, the shelter turned into trap. By this coup, the Russian naval fleet in the Far East was virtually annihilated. For staging the assault, which cost the Japanese dearly, the Japanese had landed at various places to the north of Lüshun, including near the formerly walled town of Jinzhou. Both the battles at Jinzhou and the subsequent ones in Lüshun were very bloody, especially for the victorious Japanese for whom this first major war against a European power had also an immense symbolic value. Japanese general Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典 lost also two of his own sons, one at Jinzhou when capturing

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192 This massacre had been preceded by Chinese provocations though, exhibiting mutilated Japanese soldiers to “deter” the Japanese army which backfired, a fact which is conveniently sidelined in today’s highly politicized black-and-white memorialization and exploitation of the Japanese atrocities by the Chinese official version of that history, most bluntly exhibited at the memorial for the massacre in Lüshun turned into a patriotic education showcase basis: Wanzhongmu 万忠墓 (lit.: tomb of the 10,000 loyal ones). After the event had become known, the Japanese held memorial services for the dead “Qing soldiers” (circumventing the problem of the massacred civilians) to polish their reputation. See some photographs for such activities in nearby Jinzhou in Fang Jun 方军 and Wang Shengli 王胜利 (ed.): Dalian jinbainian fengyun tulu 大连近百年风云图录 (A pictorial record of the event in Dalian’s recent 100 years), Shenyang: Liaoning remmin chubanshe 1999, part 4, photos 20-22. For photos of the Wanzhongmu-site and its commemoration through times, see Lüshunkou qu shizhi bangongshi 旅顺口区史志办公室 and Dalianshi jindaishi yanjiusuo 大连市近代史研究所 (eds.): Lüshun tushi 旅顺图史 (A pictorial history of Lüshun), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2012, pp. 52-55.

193 Here, too, the place only featured small fishing villages before, which also engaged in salt production. For a general overview on Dalian city up to 1955, see the PhD dissertation by Christian A. Hess: “From colonial jewel to socialist metropolis: Dalian, 1895–1955”, University of California, San Diego 2006.

194 This expenditure gained the city the nickname “superfluous” in Russian.

195 For some less often encountered Russian photos of early Dalian (though the dating of the photos is not always clear), see the Russian blog: https://humus.livejournal.com/2649377.html.
Nanshan 南山 (southern hill), and one at Lüshun when fighting for the commanding heights of the “hill 203” (and other forts on the hills around the harbor) from which the Russian Far Eastern Squadron then was annihilated.196 On the other hand, for Russia, where this war was – in contrast to Japan – not popular at all, the war’s outcome meant a disaster, above all since in Lüshun (Port Arthur) the Russian army general Stessel had simply surrendered after the navy’s defeat and Japanese advances on land, which fed into the revolutionary mood of the 1905 revolution in Russia. Thus, “Port Arthur” became a symbol for the incompetence of Russia’s elites. For Lüshun and the whole area, a long time under Japanese domination followed, i.e. 1905-1945, and during this time the Russian and the Japanese memorialization of the Russo-Japanese war intermingled. After 1905 the Japanese had the complete say in the whole area, the so-called “Kwantung leased territory”. Even after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 it was still the Japanese Kwantung Army effectively pulling the strings locally.

When in 1945 the Japanese had to capitulate, the whole area, now called Lüda, was a military special zone officially under Sino-Soviet co-management. It had been decided already in February 1945 between the US, UK and the Soviet Union that the Dalian trade port should be internationalized with special Soviet privileges, while the Soviet Union would be entitled to station her navy in Lüshun. (This, basically, was to entice the Soviets into promising to enter sooner or later the Far Eastern war theatre at a time the European war was drawing to a close.) And the Soviets agreed to sign a cooperation accord with the Guomindang government to this avail. In the August 14 accord between the Guomindang and the Soviet Union, more details were spelled out. However, the Soviets who had entered the war against Japan on August 9 and “liberated” the Dalian-Lüshun area – their major point of interest in Manchuria – 197 by August 22 without local bloodshed,198 were not ready to share much with the Chinese Guomindang government in practice. E.g. they refused the landing of Guomindang troops after the Japanese

196 For photos of the sons of Nogi and their steles during the Japanese era, see Lüshun tushi (2012), part 4. See also the fascinating stories of the ups and downs of respective stele commemorations in the Jinzhou area in Cui Shihao 崔世浩 (ed.): Liaonan beike 辽南碑刻 (Stele inscriptions south of the Liao [River]), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2007, p. 199 ff. The stele of the second son of Nogi who died on “hill 203” in Lüshun was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution – as other left-over Japanese steles. (See Ye Liqun 叶立群: Lüshunkou shiji 旅顺口史记 (Historical record of Lüshunkou), Beijing: Haichao chubanshe 1988, p. 4 and p. 71.) The presently standing one, thus, is new.

197 Apart from the old bills of the Russo-Japanese War open there, the excellent port facilities and the by-now very developed industrial area were the prime targets for the Soviets. The more problematic sides of the Soviet “liberation” for the inhabitants, e.g. rampant violence and frequent rapes during the first period, as well as the tensions between the Soviets and parts of the local CCP is usually excluded from PRC narratives. Cf. Christian Hess: “Big Brother is Watching: Local Sino-Soviet Relations and the Building of New Dalian, 1945-55”. In: Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz: Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Year of the People’s Republic of China, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 2007, pp. 161-183.

198 The 1945 war casualties buried in the Dalian, Jinzhou and Lüshun cemeteries were, therefore, transferred there from places in the larger region where actual battles with the Japanese occurred. On a side note, the Soviets did not hasten to free the prisoners in Lüshun’s notorious prison which – according to Chinese complaints – enabled the Japanese to kill the prisoners and destroy the evidence before handing over the keys. (Cf. Ye Liqun 1988, p. 99).
surrender, arguing Dalian was open for “trade” only, prompting the Guomindang to retaliate by trying to blockade both harbors, Dalian and Lüshun. Only Soviet ships which delivered goods transported from Vladivostok could not be blocked by the Guomindang, which saw the area as a by-now Soviet-CCP hotbed. The shortage of goods made itself soon felt locally, leading to a substantial drop in population, augmented by diseases spreading in the immediate post-WWII years. Similar to Harbin but different from most of Manchuria, in a military sense Lüda thus remained outside of the Chinese Civil War 1946-49, being de facto under Soviet Military command which tended to hold on to these two ice-free ports. Still, the blockade of the harbors meant economic shortage which not only led to a substantial reduction of inhabitants by those leaving the area for good, including the large group of Japanese residents who were repatriated in waves mainly in 1947, but also to the named food shortage and problems in health care for those staying, which is reflected in the relatively high number of dead, including infants, at the cemeteries during those years.

After 1949 and the establishment of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet co-management became more real, and in view of the Korean War (1950-1953) geographically so close-by, the Chinese Communists were also very eager to have the officially not involved Soviets there. Although today this part of history is somewhat sensitive as it does not fit well into the main narrative line of official historiography, Mao himself asked the Soviets to stay on even after 1953 for fear of an Allied intervention. Finally, it was agreed that the Soviets would leave in 1955, at the occasion of which steles of Sino-Soviet friendship were installed, and thus the Lüda area was all in all 10 years under Soviet domination: 1945-1955, which meant also that information policies there were

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199 For Chinese versions of the various treaties, accords and details on the political discussions, see *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* 苏联红军在旅大 (The Soviet Red Army in Lüda), internal publication, 1995, pp. 255-354.

200 This was quite apt, in spite of some rivalry between local cadres and the Soviets, as also CCP top cadres (who had reined in local cadres) stated in 1948: without the stationed Soviet troops, Lüda would not have come that easily into CCP hands in the end. Cf. *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* (1995), p. 367.

201 This is also one of the reasons why the archives here are notoriously difficult to access even for Chinese researchers, let alone foreigners. Even publications on this time were usually “internal” up to the 1990s. See, e.g., the material collection *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* (1995). (As the postscript reveals, it is based on materials of the Dalian CCP party history bureau which, according to the preface, were then assembled by the Dalian history gazetteer bureau which – as can be seen in the following – produced most of the official narratives on Lüda.) Only in the very last years publication policies have somewhat relaxed, and the topic made it even onto local TV with a documentary (see below) with the same title (*Sulian hongjun zai Lüda*) that came out in 2015 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of WW II’s end.

202 E.g., General Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 and Song Qingling as a government representative came to lay the foundation of the friendship stele in Lüshun for which Zhou Enlai penned the inscription. For photos, see, e.g., *Lüshun tushi* (2012), p. 250. Furthermore, generals He Long and Nie Rongzhen as well as Guo Moruo participated. (See *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* 1995: p. 376).

203 In China, due to the ameliorated relations to Russia, more outspokenly positive evaluations are also coming out in the last years. See, e.g., Leng Yibin 冷一彬 and Jiang Yaohui 蒋耀辉: *Yongheng de jiyi: Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* (1945-1955) 永恒的记忆。苏联红军在旅大 (1945-1955) (Eternal memory: The Soviet Red Army in Lüda, 1945-1955), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2015. A convenient, if clearly one-sided, chronology of the 10 “Soviet years” can be found in *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* (1995), pp. 357-378.
largely controlled by the Soviets, leaving a very favorable impression of the Soviet Union with many locals, especially those who grew up in those years. The major newspapers printed speeches of Soviet leaders and wrote about the exemplary character of the Soviet Union in various regards. Thus, the Soviet Union’s image as “elder brother” from whom to learn was propagated. However, present-day Chinese information policies stress that the PRC government always insisted on Chinese sovereignty and consistently differentiated between the Soviets and the tsarist Russians. Thus, the Chinese visitor to Lüshun is reminded that although the Soviet government originally wanted to honor also the tsarist outstanding figures of the Russo-Japanese War who died in the “defense” of Lüshun, namely Admiral Makarov who drowned with the Russian flagship and General Kondratenko who was shot at the batteries (see below), by building memorials to them, the PRC government would not agree, viewing them as imperialists and aggressors to China, to only keep reminders of the Soviet “liberation” of Lüda from the Japanese and of Sino-Soviet friendship when the Soviets were about to leave.

The years of Soviet occupation of the area are reflected also in the fact today, that there are still places called “Stalin road” etc. in Lüshun: something long gone almost everywhere else in China. And Sino-Soviet signs of friendship are still much around, in spite of the later Sino-Soviet split. This particular history also makes for the well-known inaccessibility of the local archives for researchers, foreigners in particular: there is too much that should be kept under control. Lüshun, furthermore, was taken over later by the Chinese navy, and in fact free touristic access was only allowed after 2008, reducing the closed-off military areas to a minimum.

In terms of Russian cemeteries, the area still has three in all: one in Dalian itself where the civil center had been located, hosting also some other foreign dead and the “normal” Russians living, trading and working there. At Jinzhou, the cemetery was first set up for the casualties of the Russo-Japanese War, but later also received burials of Soviets living in the area during the 1945-55 period. And finally in Lüshun, the by far largest cemetery which also boasts of being the

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204 See Sulian hongjun zai Lüda (1995), p. 15. Trajectories as the one of Prof. Zhang Daxian (see below) and the Chinese Russian choir nostalgic of that time bespeak the emotional attachment some young local Chinese developed towards the Soviet Union at the time. For Dalian’s specific place in the socialist world and its youth activities, see Christian Hess: “Sino-Soviet City: Dalian between Socialist Worlds, 1945-1955”. In: Journal of Urban History vol. 44, no. 1 (2018), pp. 9-25. At the Lüshun cemetery, a Chinese inscription on one of the last tombstones erected for a Soviet expert also bespeaks some personal ties.

205 It might be noted that to this day Makarov’s statue dominates the square in Kronstadt, the home base of the Russian navy Peter the Great once built close to St. Petersburg, while Kondratenko’s tomb in St. Petersburg’s Aleksandr Nevsky Monastery is well preserved to the present and names the respective cemetery section. The two, in a way, represent the tragic, but “honorable face” of Russian war endeavors during the Russo-Japanese War by dying with their men in action.

206 This is the historical narrative viewers are confronted with on a large explanatory plaque detailing the background of the Soviet Victory Stele in Lüshun, one of Lüshun’s main touristic attractions.

207 Harbin, for one, still features a “Stalin Park”.

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largest foreigners’ cemetery on Chinese soil, can be found.\textsuperscript{208} It was at first mainly used for the Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese war, often buried after the war by the victorious Japanese in the area where the first Russian dead during railway construction had been buried. Later, the Soviet “martyrs” who “liberated” Southern Manchuria in 1945 were buried there as well, as were the Soviet aviators fallen in the Korean War. Since the Soviet Union was not officially participating in that war, the involvement of these Soviet aviators had to be kept secret,\textsuperscript{209} and this was also one further reason why the Lüshun area was off limits for such a long time. This, however, did not completely spare the Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery of vandalism in the times of the Cultural Revolution either.\textsuperscript{210}

As for the Dalian cemetery for Russians, located in Dalian’s central Zhongshan 中山 district, this is since 2009 called “Dalian Qingyunjie Sujun lieshi muyuan” 大连青云街苏军烈士墓园 (Dalian Qingyun Street Soviet martyrs cemetery) (notably in Russian again without “martyrs”: “Soviet military cemetery”).\textsuperscript{211} As the on-spot stone sign, put up 2009, claims in accordance with the official gazetteers, it is built as an extension of the former cemetery built around the turn of the 20th century, and since 1945 hosts a part of the “martyrs” and other military personnel who died on the Liaodong peninsula up to 1956.\textsuperscript{212} While the soldiers were usually buried with flat tombstones [ill. 33], the officers received steles with a red star on [ill. 34].\textsuperscript{213} In all, the number of 612 tombs are given, comprising 371 Soviet military tombs, 54 family members (including many children), and the rest (i.e. 187) being “other” Russians or other foreigners.\textsuperscript{214} With these “other” Russians, the tsarist, émigré and non-military-connected civilians are intended. As the

\textsuperscript{208} For some old photos taken by Russians, see the orthodox.cn website, e.g. “Dalian graves”: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/19130901iskryPg268-269_en.htm.

\textsuperscript{209} The US, however, had realized early on that they were de facto combatting skilled aviators from the Soviet Union but also preferred to not address the issue openly to not get into a full-scale world war. But neither did the Chinese side want to credit the Soviet aviators’ decisive role during the times of the Sino-Soviet split, not the least because it could diminish the sacrifice of the Chinese “volunteers” in the Korean War. Cf. Ma Dianwen (2015), pp. 17-19.

\textsuperscript{210} Since the archives are not accessible, it is hard to find any sources for that period when Lüshun was still closed off. However, occasionally in printed sources there are hints. In fact, the destruction noted by Aleksandr Koval in 1996 (see below) and the still visible traces of destroyed photos on the tombs suggest that even in this military-controlled place the Cultural Revolution “destroy the Four Olds” campaign did not spare those foreign “martyrs’” tombs, although the military subsequently sealed the place off to further damage. Cf. the brief, cautious hint in Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 20, citing a cemetery staff member.


\textsuperscript{212} The “martyrs”, i.e. the casualties of the 1945 “August Storm”, were moved to this already existing Russian cemetery from the battle sites to the north of Dalian, since Dalian itself – as Harbin – was no site of armed conflict. Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 23. I am grateful to a local history professor for helping me get access to the usually closed-off Qingyunjie cemetery.


\textsuperscript{214} E.g., there are single English, Greek and German tombs to be found. According to the Dalian gazetteer on religion, the Orthodox community comprised at their best times 2.355 people, including besides Russia and Belarus also people from Germany, Czechia, Greece and China (mostly of mixed decent). See Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 169.
Dalian Gazetteer on Religion stated in 2002, the tsarist tombs amount to 69, of which 8 are collective tombs, many hosting navy sailors who died on sea and were transferred here.\textsuperscript{215} An earlier description of the tsarist/émigré part is given in the already named 1938 Russian publication from Harbin, “Forgotten Graves”, which took stock of Russian military cemeteries in Manchuria at that time with photos,\textsuperscript{216} based on a first Russian survey after the Russo-Japanese war, led by Golubev and Bolkhovitinov, and a subsequent commission led by General Dobronravov before WW I to organize an appropriate commemoration of the fallen soldiers in the Boxer War and the Russo-Japanese War from the Tsar’s side.\textsuperscript{217} According to that source, in 1938 the cemetery had over 300 graves, had first been mostly for civilians and out of town, but by then was already in the midst of the urbanized area. Two large crosses still in place were dedicated to mass graves, one of them for the casualties of the minelayer Enis\textae y sunk early in 1904 by one of its own mines off Dalian [ill. 35].\textsuperscript{218} One of the more prominent civilians is Feliks Briner, son of a rich Swiss entrepreneur in Vladivostok and uncle of the Hollywood actor Yul Brynner, who was buried there in 1942 [ill. 36].\textsuperscript{219}

After the October Revolution the maintenance of the cemetery had been organized locally with the help of the Orthodox Church, but the establishment of Manchukuo and the changing Soviet-Japanese relations with the transfer of the railway rights to the Japanese in 1935 necessitated the creation of a Board of Trustees under émigré General Mikhail Khanzhin who had fought already in the Russo-Japanese War. This board which looked also after the other Russian cemeteries in the area was thus established in 1935.\textsuperscript{220} The list of the present Russian Ministry of Defense, signed in 2018, gives a total of 930 people of which 585 are unknown ones of the Russo-Japanese War, while of the 345 known ones originally identified by war veteran Ivanov et al. in 1996 when touring China to take stock of Soviet memorials and tombs in China, 40 are of 1945, 112 of the year 1946 and 178 of the years 1947-1949. The final 15 were after 1949.\textsuperscript{221} 

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\item \textsuperscript{216} Zabytyya mogily (1938).
\item \textsuperscript{218} For the minelayer Enisey, cf. http://www.navypedia.org/ships/russia/ru_ms_amur01.htm. See also Kowner: Historical Dictionary… (2006), pp. 112-113. For an old photo of the tomb, see the illustration part of Zabytyya mogily (1938).
\item \textsuperscript{219} Cf. the news report of Natal’ya Shemetova in Komsomol’ckaya Pravda, September 15, 2015, available online: https://www.kp.by/daily/26429/3304735/. For more background of the influential Brynner family, including also some details on Feliks Briner (as he is spelt on the tomb and who was buried near Anna Timofeevna Blagovidova, apparently his mother-in-law who had died in 1936), see the colorful family portrait by Yul’s son Rock Brynner: Empire & Odyssey: the Brynners in Far East Russia and Beyond, Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Zabytyya mogily (1938), p. 26.
\item \textsuperscript{221} See https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155162666. The Soviet known ones are taken over from Ivanov et al. (1997), pp. 72-81, who had published the results of their survey in 1997. This is surprising insofar as the mentioned on-spot plaque of 2009 had more “Soviet” tombs (371 military plus 54 family member graves). It is not
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Russian Ministry of Defense which drew up lists of the buried, at first detailed 257 Soviet tombs for the Qingyunjie Cemetery, but other lists provide 345 or 346 names (which is in any case less than the 371 Soviet military tombs given on the on-spot plaque). These are all military dead of 1945-1950, including some 5 females belonging to the military. In this, all pre-1945 civilian individual tombs are not even addressed, concentrating on the military. This should be borne in mind when using figures of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s memorial website. The Qingyunjie cemetery is today managed by the Dalian municipal Civil Affairs Bureau. However, the Chechen-Russian Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation was allowed to finance a restoration effort in 2015. This was done at the request of the Russian Club in Dalian, and the ceremony after the completion was attended also by the Russian ambassador to China and the Russian consul in Shenyang who serves the three northeastern provinces of China today. It is highly probable that this was connected to a Russian national program to specifically care for Russian/Soviet military tombs abroad, 2011-2015, not the least prompted by Eastern European moves to “liberate” themselves of Soviet “liberator” memorials (see below).

222 See the alternative list of the Qingyunjie Cemetery on the Ministry’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262075557&p=3. The list is not dated. There is a further list with 346 entries of the Ministry, the cemetery given as “Qinyuananjie” in Dalian: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262080028&p=1 of 2001. The newest of, again, correctly Qingyunjie, is the named one signed recently: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155162666. Here the date of signatures by representatives of the Russian embassy in China as well as the Ministry of Defense is June 15, 2018 (like for those of Jinzhou and Lüshun, see below). The list itself, though, is still that of Ivanov et al. (1997), pp. 72-81. To complete the picture, it might be mentioned that the district gazetteer of 2002 even mentioned 385 Red Army tombs among a total of 488, receiving municipal funds for restoration in 1987. (See Dalianshi Zhongshanqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 大连市中山区地方志编纂委员会 (ed.): Zhongshan quzhi 中山区志 (Zhongshan district gazetteer), Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe 2002, p. 362.) This shows figures diverge among the sources.

223 See the on-spot stone sign.

224 See the latter’s on-spot stone plaque. Akhmat Kadyrov was a Chechen mufti who in the 1990s first fought against the Russians but then collaborated with the Kremlin, which made him a target of Islamist terror. He was killed 2004 by a bomb during the celebrations of Victory Day, i.e. the end of the Second World War, with his son Ramzan Kadyrov succeeding him as head of the Chechen Republic. This son is named as having supported the restoration of the Dalian Qingyun Street Cemetery together with the Foundation he set up in the name of his father, who is notably called a “Russian” hero. The Foundation has been criticized as somewhat dubious in several media, but has funded various projects also outside of Chechnya or elsewhere in Russia. According to the Dalian Russian Club, the argument used to convince the foundation to support the restoration were the roughly 30 tombs of people from the Caucasus. (See the news report by Natal’ya Shemetova in Komsomol’ckaya Pravda, September 15, 2015, available online: https://www.kp.by/daily/26429/3304735/).

225 See the report by Sergey Eryomin: “V Dalyane torzhestvenno otkryli otrestravrivannoe russkoe voinskoe kladbishche” (The restored Russian military cemetery was solemnly opened in Dalian). September 24, 2015(b). Available online: http://pravfond.ru/?module=articles&action=view&id=1494.

226 These Soviet-critical movements were received by Russia as anti-Russian and as attempts to “rewrite history”, questioning the “liberating” role of the Soviet Red Army, especially in Estonia, but also elsewhere in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe where the memorials were now seen as signs of oppression.
As the numbers of the listed identified graves show, the tombs are mostly of the second half of the 1940s, i.e. after the “August Storm of 1945” and thus, technically speaking, not of “martyrs” in the Chinese sense, while earlier tombs often are of sailors, including Western ones of “commercial” ships [ill. 37]. Typically, the original photos on the tombstones have disappeared. While the lower-level Soviet part of the cemetery where tombs connected to the military are located is kept very tidy, the part more up-hill with crosses where civil and also tsarist tombs are to be found with only occasional red starred Soviet tombs in between, is rather left to nature. The area is on two hills, one of which had an orthodox church dedicated to archangel Michael built, now erased because of the Cultural Revolution. A chapel had first been erected around 1902 when the city of Dalian was still under construction. After the Russo-Japanese War, the now Japanese authorities offered it to the Japanese Orthodox Church, but by 1909 it was again in Russian hands, administered by the Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission. In 1912 it was renovated on the order of the tsarist mission to look after the Russian military tombs in Manchuria. Later, Japanese Orthodox priest Suzuki administered it. The chapel was expanded in the late 1920s and again in 1935 into a church.

Nearby the place where the church had been, there are today also tombs of orthodox priests, most notably of Marin Korovin [ill. 38], sometimes called the “last Russian” (actually Belarusian) priest of the Mikhailovsky church (presumably since the follower cancelled the alignment with ROCOR to join the Moscow Patriarchate and thus would not “count” for some Orthodox) who served there during his last years up to his death in 1953, having served at Harbin’s Iveron church before. His tombstone, though broken, had been found by his relatives subsequently,

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227 For some old photos, see the illustration part of Zabytyya mogily (1938). See also http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/archangelmichael_en.htm.
228 Some sources speak of 1902 as the founding of the chapel which was later enlarged to a church. The gazetteer on religion dates the chapel to 1912. Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 164, stating also that in 1902 there were plans which, however, could not be realized because of the Russo-Japanese War. (See also ibid. p. 169.) However, the chapel must have existed earlier, given the discussion about who should administer it between the Russians and the Japanese. Formerly, this cemetery was named after the street name of the time, Jieshanjie 捷山街.
232 According to Tatiana Erohina, her paternal grandfather, Fr. Mikhail [Erokhin], had been instrumental in bringing this about. He had, according to her (not always historically accurate) account, served at the church and was then assigned to the Philippines and finally to California. See Tatiana Erohina: Growing Up Russian in China: A Historical Memoir, Bloomington: iUniverse 2011, p. 5. Tatiana’s father (and son of Fr. Mikhail) is buried in the Qingyunjie cemetery. For a photo of the tomb of 1954 vs. one taken in 1988 as well as of the church and Fr. Mikhail, see ibid., illustration sheets.
233 Unfortunately, during my visit it was not possible to get closer to this section.
234 According to his relatives, he served in Dalian his last 10 years, as a long-term Russian resident of Dalian was told: see L. V. Szazanova (Voronova): “The Gleaming Light of the Past” (2004). Available online: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/lightfrompast_en.htm. However, according to the Dalian gazetteer on
and thus was restored by them in the 1990s. He was in fact the third non-Asian priest serving the church. Before him, the serving priest had gone back in 1947 to the Soviet Union (as would the one after him in 1954 and a nun who cared in the subsequent interim phase who went back in 1956, before the church came into Chinese hands). Priest Zhu Shipu then cared for the Mikhailovsky church who subsequently would take over the Harbin diocese (see above). The first non-Asian priest prior to Korovin, however, who was buried as well in Dalian, had died apparently suddenly in 1940: Petr Rozhdestvensky. He was of Belarusian descent and decidedly anti-Soviet, having served in the White Army as a military chaplain and later most of the time in Harbin. He, too, was de facto buried in this cemetery which was seen as a Belarusian cemetery, being in the hands of Soviet-critical “White” clergy. (This might also explain why the Soviets rather opted for having their own church built at the former Shintô shrine location during their stay in Lüda – see below). The tomb of this earlier priest seems to be largely neglected. In 1958 after the establishment of the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church and thus the end of the former Orthodox administration, all possessions of the Orthodox, including the religious buildings, were handed over in the Lüda area to the People’s Committee of Lüda, but were at first still open for the Chinese Orthodox to use. In 1964, a telling memorandum of the Dalian bureau of religion appealed to the higher administrative levels to help the Orthodox which had funding problems, also mentioning that the destruction of tombs should be stopped, and two housing buildings meanwhile constructed on the cemetery’s grounds should be removed! But already two years later with the Cultural Revolution, the church was destroyed and religious activities stopped altogether. On the spot where the church had been, an administrative building was erected instead. Notably, for the Soviet Red Army and their families, in 1947 a separate church had been built on the spot where the Japanese had their main Shintô Shrine

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235 See L. V. Sazanova (2004) who had contacted the relatives who provided also a brief biography: http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/lightfrompast_en.htm. For a then-and later photo contrast of the tomb, see: http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/liaoning/dalian/archangelmichael_en.htm. In the meantime, a cross has been added.

236 For the priests serving at the Archangel St. Michael’s Church, see the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), p. 175. There was also some lower-level staff serving at the church. The first priest given by this Chinese source (in transliteration characters) can be identified as Petr Rozhdestvensky who died in 1940. See his biography available online: https://drevo-info.ru/articles/13676395.html. According to this orthodox website, though, there was father Gavrili Ogorodnikov for one year before him, i.e. since 1935. See https://drevo-info.ru/articles/14656.html. According to the Dalian religious gazetteer, Father Gavrili was however the second and returned to the Soviet Union in 1947. In Kharin (2014, chapter 12) it is stated that the Japanese priest Suzuki returned to Dalian in 1929 for serving the Japanese Orthodox to set up a prayer house for them, but also served at the cemetery chapel (i.e. the Mikhailovsky chapel) for Russians. In 1937 after the prayer house was built for the Japanese Orthodox in Dalian, he is said to have celebrated the opening together with Fr. Gavrili “from the Beijing diocese”. (When Suzuki himself died in 1946, his funeral was attended almost exclusively by Russians since the Japanese faithful had left.) (Ibid. p. 310).

237 It had been the priest Zhu Shipu (cf. above for his role in Harbin) who had struck the deal with the city government. See the Dalian gazetteer of religion: Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 165.

238 See the Dalian gazetteer on religion, p. 165.

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before, not very far from the cemetery: the Aleksandr Nevsky church, which was however closed in 1955 when the Soviets left.\textsuperscript{240} When in 1964 an official list of Orthodox believers was set up, it amounted only to 35, 11 of which were non-Chinese; and in 1985, after the Cultural Revolution, just 7 Orthodox (3 of which non-Chinese) were listed.\textsuperscript{241}

The second Russian cemetery in the area, located on Nanshan (southern hill) near the old once-walled city of Jinzhou where the Japanese landed during the Russo-Japanese War to cut off the southern part of the peninsula at the neck-hole, now part of Dalian municipality with a new “special experimental zone” to the east of the old settlement, was set up originally for the Russian casualties of the war with Japan. It was the Japanese who had collected the Russian dead after the 1904 battle of Nanshan for burial, but the fact that close-by the Japanese memorial to their costly conquest and the one to the death of General Nogi’s son (today erased) obviously had necessitated barbed wire to protect the Russian crosses, bespeaks the more tense relationship in the commemoration in Jinzhou after the Russo-Japanese war.\textsuperscript{242} Today, the cemetery still hosts a collective memorial to the Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese War, and these figure in the lists of the Russian Ministry of Defense today as 1.403 unknown of the 2.227 in total listed for the whole cemetery. This Russo-Japanese War cemetery was reused when the Soviets came into the area in 1945 to stay until 1955,\textsuperscript{243} and the 824 known burials in that cemetery of this time of Soviet presence comprise casualties of 1945,\textsuperscript{244} while the majority died after this up to 1955,\textsuperscript{245} including casualties of the Korean War, but also some 7 females connected to the military.\textsuperscript{246}

The cemetery, first called “Nanshan Russian Military Cemetery” by the Chinese, was declared as “Soviet Martyrs’ cemetery” in 1953,\textsuperscript{247} and the present memorial stele in front of the gate (a Jinzhou district monument since 1957) was transferred there from the former railway station

\textsuperscript{240} See the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), p. 171.
\textsuperscript{241} See the Dalian gazetteer on religion (2002), pp. 172-173 and p. 177.
\textsuperscript{242} Cf. the 1938 account of the cemetery’s state in Zabytyya mogily (1938), pp. 48-49. I am grateful to Fr. Andrey Bukhteev for letting me participate in a ceremony at the cemetery and guiding me to the place the Japanese stele once stood.
\textsuperscript{243} In Jinzhou, the Soviets stationed the 39th army, i.e. the people buried in those years up to 1955 were usually of this army.
\textsuperscript{244} Again, also Jinzhou was not itself a site of battles. Thus, the dead were transferred there from the battles further to the north. Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 36.
\textsuperscript{245} As it seems from the lists, the last burials were de facto in 1954.
\textsuperscript{246} See the list of the Jinzhou Cemetery on the Ministry’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155161807&p=1. The list is signed in 2018 and for the “41 Soviet casualties of 1945” bases itself on Ivanov et al. who provided a list in 1997 (see there pp. 189-190.) It seems the data on the casualties of 1946 (3 of them listed already by Ivanov et al., though) to 1955 were collected only later, as part of the Ministry’s list is declared as based on the state found in 2007. However, comparing the lists of the Ministry and of Ivanov et al., several of Ivanov et al.’s names were corrected with death dates after 1945, while other 1945 dead were individuated which did not appear in Ivanov et al. Thus, de facto the Ministry’s list has only 32 people who died in 1945 which means these are the potential casualties of fighting with the Japanese, i.e. “martyrs” in the Chinese sense, together with the Korean War casualties.
\textsuperscript{247} See Dalianshi Jinhzhouqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi 大连市金州区地方志编纂委员会办公室: Jinxianzhi 金县志 (Jin county gazetteer), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 1989, p. 536.
location in 2004 [ill. 39]. This was that stele’s second “move” since it had originally been built by the Soviets on Dalian’s big square in front of the city government in 1946 (to be named “Stalin Square in 1947”)249 as a “victory stele” and was “moved” from there (actually rebuilt and renamed as a memorial stele to the “Soviet Red Army Martyrs”) to Jinzhou’s railway station in 1953-1955 to make room for a new stele on Dalian’s Stalin Square in honor of the “Soviet Red Army Martyrs” there.250 In Russian parlance, again the cemetery is just called “Soviet Military Cemetery” (without “Martyrs”).

The Jinzhou cemetery [ill. 40] clearly differentiates between the Soviets and the (in Chinese eyes problematic) tsarist casualties, marking the latter off with a wall [ill. 41]. These are only collectively remembered, mainly by the monument installed by the tsarist delegation after the Russo-Japanese war. A Sino-Russian plaque of 2016 states that the cemetery was restored 2013-2015 with “Russian money”, though not giving any foundation in this case. In fact, the Russian Ministry of Defense had obviously sponsored it.251 Notably, here the tombs are only numbered as 673, “hosting” “over 1000” Soviet “martyrs”/“heroes” (glossing over the existence of Russo-Japanese War casualties there, but also not explicitly addressing the family members of the Soviet military which might explain the difference in numbers with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s list). The Soviet “martyrs”/“heroes” include also a few aviators [ill. 42], although most of the air force casualties of the Korean War are buried in Lüshun (see below). Apart from individual tombs which at times show the military unit [ill. 43], the cemetery also has several newly set-up memorial bronze-color wreaths with plaques of names which obviously have been found in lists but do not correspond to any remains [ill. 44], ordered according to rank. Interestingly, the original list of “martyrs”, intending those who died during the “liberation” of Manchuria from the Japanese in 1945 and were transferred there, was drawn up by the Chinese in 1971 during the Cultural Revolution!252 It provided only names but no ranks, to the chagrin of the Russians who based themselves on this list when they took stock of Soviet tombs in China in the mid-1990s. Obviously in the context of the 2007 accord between China and Russia on the maintenance of Soviet tombs, the Russian Ministry of Defense made a more intensive on-spot investigation to draw up lists of its own.253 This then served as a basis for the recent renovation efforts.

250 See Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 37-39 and p. 217 on the Jinzhou stele, and pp. 30-34 on the later one on Dalian’s Stalin Square (which then was moved to the Lüshun cemetery where it is now – see below).
251 This assumption has been confirmed by Fr. Bukhteev. Personal communication May 20, 2019.
252 See Ivanov et al. (1997), p. 188, footnote. It might be mentioned that the foreign policy implications were never absent, even during the Cultural Revolution, which led to the call to differentiate between “types” of people and to at least keep records, though this was not always heeded in practice. Cf. Müller (2018a), pp. 21-22.
253 See the already referred-to list of the Ministry’s memorial website, p. 14, which explains that the second part of its present list had been drawn up according to the tombstone inscriptions found in situ in 2007.
The final and largest Russian cemetery is the one in Lüshun [ill. 45]. In China, it is commonly referred to as the “largest foreigners’ cemetery on Chinese soil”.\(^{254}\) The Russian Ministry of Defense lists 314 military burials (for the time 1945-1955), though Lüshun itself, like the whole Dalian area, at these times did not live through military confrontation.\(^{255}\) This means, the cemetery rather functioned as a central burial place for Soviet military staff dying in the larger region, most notably including also 202 pilots that clandestinely participated in and died during the Korean War (1950-1953). The Soviet Union did not officially enter the Korean War for fear of setting off a new world war (which also made the US turn a blind eye to Soviet involvement), but sent war material and, above all, experienced aviators to help the North Korean/Chinese side. Because of this situation, the tombs of the fallen Soviet aviators who were allowed to only fight not too far into North Korean territory to make sure they could be transferred back, and in consequence the whole cemetery had to be kept secret during Cold War times.\(^{256}\) The Soviet pilots are a special group with tombstones featuring small airplanes [ill. 46].\(^{257}\) They include also some “heroes of the Soviet Union”. As for the Soviets in all, unsurprisingly the largest group (52%) were lower and middle rank in the military, while the officers made up 17.4%. The list of the Ministry of Defense also shows that some 11 females attached to the military were buried there in the time of the Soviet presence. These included, e.g., hospital nurses.\(^{258}\) But beyond the active military, already during the preceding years of blockade of the Dalian-Lüshun area during the Chinese Civil War (1946-49) there were many, not the least children of Red Army families, who died of diseases [ill. 47], augmented by the rather poor sanitary conditions. One of the main problems for smaller children was encephalitis transmitted by mosquitoes, until a vaccine was developed. Thus, the high rate of 23.3% of children’s burials can be explained.\(^{259}\) But also further family members who died during the whole time of Soviet presence in Lüshun are to be found in the cemetery [ill. 48]. The children’s burials are focused in one area as are the other civilians, thus showing an on-principle zoning approach to the burial spaces.

However, the bulk of the burials in the Lüshun cemetery are of earlier times. Already during the very first Russian presence around the turn of the 20th century there and given that the place was used by the Japanese after winning the war against Russia for centrally burying the Russian dead, there were numbers reported in 1907 that amounted to 14,873 Russian military dead plus some

\(^{254}\) See, e.g., Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 2.

\(^{255}\) See the list of the Lüshun Cemetery of the Ministry of Defense’s memorial website: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=262079951. The list seems to be of 2018 but is obviously based on Koval’s 2011 booklet (see below).

\(^{256}\) Cf. Ma Dianwan (2015), p. 17. The 202 dead aviators, however, were not all of the shot-down Soviet aviators, since 345 airplanes were lost. See Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 26-27.

\(^{257}\) For a list of all military staff that died 1950-1953 and are buried in the cemetery (over 300), see the survey by Ivanov et al., published 1997, based on the archives of the Ministry of Defense: there pp. 253-262. There is a special memorial to the aviators who “died for Stalin”. (Cf. [ill. 46], highest memorial with wreath and flowers.)

\(^{258}\) See, i.a., the example given by Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 22.

\(^{259}\) Koval (2011, see below), p. 83, provides the different percentages.
family members or other civilians, in total around 16,600 buried there, many of the military staff in mass graves without individual information. The cemetery thus has basically two parts today: the front (Eastern) part for the Soviets [ill. 49], and the rear (Western) part where originally the entrance had been (now a closed side entrance) for the tsarist ones. It should be noted, that there are also a few Jewish tombs in a tiny extra section [ill. 50], and very few civilian “Western European” tombs as well [ill. 51], though not all placed together. The most detailed listing of tombstones has been done by Aleksandr Koval together with Zhang Daxian (see below). They listed every tombstone, and Koval published it in Moscow to make it also possible for Russians to find their relatives’ tombs. Koval and Zhang found 1,845 personal tombs: 529 from the time of 1898-1945, and 1,316 of the 1945-1955 period. All in all, Koval concluded there were 15,131 burials between 1898 and 1935, and 2,045 in the Soviet period 1945-1955, bringing the total to 17,176. Of the earlier times, apart from the main group of Russo-Japanese War casualties, he found 26 dead when defending the Railway in 1900-1901, i.e. against the Boxers; and 9 foreigners (which included also children), according to Koval employees of a German trading company, mostly in the very early years and probably connected to the railway.

In those very first years there were, in fact, also several civilians. While some early civil burials were simply behind the railway station, the Russians started to use the present location

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261 According to Zabyttya mogily (1938), p. 35, there were 14 Jews originally, separated by a line of thujas. Today, the most eye-catching Jewish tombstone is of a young woman who died in 1901 (and according to the tombstone was from then-Austrian Tarnopol – now Ternopil in the Ukraine: strangely her non-Russian Austrian nationality is not addressed in any available source). Apart from the number of Jews, Zabyttya mogily gives 7 Germans and 3 Danes. The latter could additionally explain why also a Protestant pastor was invited to join the reopening after restoration by the Russians in 2010 though he seems to not have been on spot but was interviewed by the Russian TV elsewhere (cf. the short youtube news video, available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41ayvVvfjk). Of course, there have likely been also “Russian” Protestants present in the tsarist army. Koval (2011, see below), though, found only 7 “Western” names in his survey which seem to include the 3 Danes, but less Germans, all having died between 1899 and 1917, i.e. during tsarist times, and obviously civilians.
264 Cf. Koval (2011), p. 8 and p. 83. As noted above, in terms of (non-Cyrillic) “Western” names, he, however, provides only 7 (p. 82).
266 For a photo said to be of the civilian burial of engineer Vladimir V. Sakharov, main planner of Vladivostok, of Dal’ny (Dalian) and first mayor of this nascent city, and planner of Lüshun’s defense architecture who died during the Russo-Japanese War of illness (not listed by the Ministry of Defense’s website or in Koval’s 2011 booklet, thus obviously in the other cemetery that was set up behind the railway station), see Lüshun tushi (2012), p. 69. It should be mentioned that Sakharov was portrayed negatively as a traitor in Aleksandr Stepanov’s very influential historical novel Port Arthur. (A. Stepanov: Port Arthur: A Historical Narrative, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1947). He apparently was ordered to destroy the port facilities of Dal’ny as much as possible when retreating with the Russian population from there to Port Arthur before the advancing Japanese, though the damage inflicted
since 1898 [ill. 52], mainly designed for the military, above all the navy. The Orthodox Church cared for the burials, which became ever more frequent after the start of the Russo-Japanese War. Only outstanding figures like General Roman Kondratenko who was a key figure in the months-long defense of Lüshun against the Japanese and was killed by them during the war, were transferred back to St. Petersburg for burial. Although there are still several individual tombs of 1904/05 in the cemetery which had been set up by the Russians as long as they held Port Arthur, most of the war casualties were buried there only later after the Japanese had conquered Lüshun and transferred most dead Russians there.

When the Japanese buried the Russian casualties of the Russo-Japanese War afterwards to demonstrate to the world that they knew how to treat dead foes respectfully in a “civilized” way, they did so centrally, since the Russian fallen soldiers had first been buried on spot at 28 different battle fields. Now they were grouped together and centralized at the cemetery, with the Japanese fallen with their own cemetery near-by, though. While burying the Russians, the Japanese differentiated between sailors and soldiers who were interred usually nameless with smaller iron crosses [ill. 53], and the officers who received marble crosses [ill. 54]. The mass graves of transferred casualties from particular battle sites beyond Port Arthur were grouped together with large elegant marble crosses [ill. 55], close to the impressive European classical temple-like mausoleum which the Japanese built after the war as an eye-catching sight of

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267 For an oft-reprinted 1905 colored photo with a priest looking after the war dead, see, e.g., Betsy C. Perabo: *Russian Orthodoxy and the Russo-Japanese War*, London et al.: Bloomsbury 2017, p. 149. At the time, the cemetery only had a small prayer hall. The chapel would be added years later in 1912 (see below). (See Dalianshi shizhi bangongshi 大连市史志办公室 (ed.): *Dalianshi zhi. Minzuzhi, zongjiaozhi* 大连市志。民族志, 宗教志 (Gazetteer of Dalian municipality: ethnic gazetteer, religious gazetteer). Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2002, religious gazetteer part, p. 164). The first burial at the present location was according to Koval a crew member of the navy. See Koval (2011), p. 4.

268 He was given a state funeral and buried, as already mentioned, in St. Petersburg’s Aleksandr Nevsky Monastery Cemetery where his tombstone is still standing, while the Japanese later put up a stone stele at the place where he had been killed. (Cf. Rotem Kowner: *Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War*, Lanham: Scarecrow 2006, pp. 188-189). For a photo of the Japanese stele to Kondratenko, see the collection of old photographs in *Da’lian jiuying* (“Old Fashions of Dalian”), Beijing: Renmin meishu chubanshe 2007, p. 57.

269 See *Zabyttya mogily* (1938), p. 32.

270 According to *Zabyttya mogily* (1938), p. 34, the Japanese military cemetery (now unsurprisingly not extant any longer) was southeast of the Russian one.


272 Given the high numbers of hundreds and thousands, it may be assumed that the Japanese followed their own custom and cremated the bodies before burial. Theoretically, though, there were orders to only cremate the Japanese but give the Russians their customary earth burials. Cf. Tino Schölz: “Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten rühmen”. *Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (“To appease the fallen and to glorify their deeds”: The Cult of the Fallen and the political constitution in Japan since the mid-19th century), Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2016, p. 173.
“generous” collective remembrance of the defeated [ill. 56], where they staged the pompous opening of the cemetery, inviting Russian representatives to participate. All in all, there were over 15,000 Russian casualties of that war buried here, including also female nurses [ill. 57].

The Japanese builders of the cemetery, though, complicate the “cultural-religious” connection, and the relationship to the Orthodox Church was fairly complicated, too. Officially, the Beijing Ecclesiastical Mission was responsible for Russian cemeteries in Lüshun. Since the Russian Orthodox Church had also a mission in Japan led by the Russian Bishop (later Archbishop) Nikolay (Kasatkin), better known as “Nicholas of Japan”, who was understandably in a delicate position in Tokyo during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Orthodox Church was now involved, too. On the other hand, for some Russians the fact that the Port Arthur Icon of the Triumph of the Theotokos (God-Bearer) did not reach its destination Lüshun in time to protect the Russians there was part of the reason of defeat. This icon had been drawn upon a vision of a sailor in Kiev in 1903 before the outbreak of the war which shows the Virgin Mary, holding a Mandylion, standing on two crossed broken swords with God Father and two angels above and a port in the background. According to the account of the visionary sailor, the icon should be made and brought to Port Arthur to protect the Russians in an upcoming war there from “paganism”. Otherwise, disaster would follow.

The icon got stuck in Vladivostok, and after the war’s end would certainly have created tensions with the victorious Japanese, had it been in place, because of its predicted “victory over paganism” (i.e. the “non-Christian” Japanese). From Vladivostok, in turn, the icon disappeared during the tumultuous times following the October Revolution and was said to have been rediscovered in Jerusalem in 1998. (During the recent restoration of the Lüshun cemetery, a consecrated copy was made and installed in the chapel there.)

Back in 1908, when the Japanese had the “showcase” cemetery of Russians/foreigners officially opened, Russian Bishop Innokenty (Figurovsky) of the Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing was

273 Cf., e.g., the eye-catching monument with an angel of an Ekaterina [ill. 57] said to have been the prototype of the nurse Varya in Aleksandr Stepanov’s famous Soviet-era novel on the defense of Port Arthur (Stepanov 1947). For a photo comparison of the tomb before and after the restoration, see Kirill Elizarov’s (see below) presentation of the restoration project on youtube (2011): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLAX31SfVo0&t=125s, min. 2:29.

274 For more on the complicated relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church, Japan and Lüshun, and how this played into issues of theological positions on warfare, see Betsy Perabo (2017), chapters 6-9.


277 According to the e-book Port Arthur, p. 57, a consecrated copy was made and placed at the end of the restoration work in the chapel at the cemetery, which is, however, usually closed. (The e-book is accessible as a pdf file via: http://www.funcommunications.com/public-relations/port-arthur.) For a Russian news report of the placing of the copy in the chapel in December 2010, see “Spisok Port-Arturskoy ikony Bozhiey Materi ustanovlen v chasovne na russkom kladbishche v Port-Arture” (Roll of the Port Arthur Icon of the Mother of God installed in the chapel at the Russian cemetery in Port Arthur). Available online: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1338007.html. For a photo of the icon inside the chapel, see http://www.orthodox.cn/images/20110831lushuncemetery.jpg.
present as a guest.\textsuperscript{278} In 1912 the Russian government asked the Japanese authorities for being allowed to set up a huge white marble cross (as they did elsewhere in cemeteries)\textsuperscript{279} as the center of the cemetery to honor their own dead after Tsar Nicholas II had decreed that the military cemeteries in the Far East should be taken care of now also from the Russian side [ill. 58]. Furthermore, the Russians requested to be allowed to set up a chapel dedicated to St. Equal-to-the-apostles Vladimir, which, however, remained very small, probably to not visually challenge the Japanese-built mausoleum.\textsuperscript{280} At the time the Russians put forward their request, Japan had been firmly established in Lüshun anyway and in fact was looking for a new rapprochement with Russia. It thus seems that the cemetery was put to use for diplomatic agendas. On the huge cross built by the Russians, an icon of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker had been placed (which was, according to the recent restoration project, destroyed during the Cultural Revolution). In 1913, remains of six further Russo-Japanese War casualties were added to the cemetery when the Japanese located the wreck of the former Russian flagship Petropavlovsk sunk in the harbor. They claimed the remains to include those of Admiral Makarov, the commander, and those of well-known painter Vereshchagin, and buried the bones in the cemetery with great fanfare and a guard of honor, though the claims remain unascertained as the sinking of the flagship entailed around 700 casualties with only few survivors, and there was no way to decide whether the bones rescued after almost a decade in the sea included those of the two “VIPS”.\textsuperscript{281} Makarov’s coat, however, had been found floating in the water after the Petropavlovsk had sunk in 1904 and was now installed as a kind of relic in the chapel.\textsuperscript{282}

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\textsuperscript{278} Ibid. For a critical essayistic treatment of the cemetery and its political “uses”, see local Chinese female writer Susu 素素 (Wang Suying 王素英); \textit{Lüshunkou wangshi} 旅顺口往事 (The past of Lüshunkou), Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe 2012, pp. 379-397. The opening in 1908 was reported also in the Western press at the time. See, e.g., the English version of a French report: “Japanese honor 15.000 Russian dead” in \textit{Popular Mechanics}, vol. 10 (1908), pp. 576-577.

\textsuperscript{279} For similar crosses, see the illustration part in \textit{Zabytyya mogily} (1938), showing further examples in Manchuria. Since they have – as the one in Lüshun – a round filled with an icon on the upper part, one may assume that the one in Lüshun now void also had an icon in there once. In one case the icon on top can be identified as a Christ which means that maybe the plaque in Lüshun stating that there had been an original icon of Christ once on the cross might refer to this upper round, while the icon of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker was where it is also now. Apparently, the question of the existence or not of an icon of Christ had created some disputes in Russia during the recent restoration (see below). See “Port-Artur. Chuzhaya istoriya” (Port Arthur: strange history) (2010). Available online: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/11/10/762-port-artur-chuzhaya-istoriya. (For the on-spot reference to an original icon of Christ, cf. the photo of a plaque in the e-book \textit{Port Arthur} p. 40, stating this.)


\textsuperscript{281} Koval (2011), p. 8, for one, refutes the claim.

\textsuperscript{282} Cf. Levoshko (2005), p. 5. As noted above, Makarov remained a “hero” also during Soviet times.
Whereas the care for the Russian war dead (and the occasional civilians who were now centrally buried in this “non-Asian cemetery” as well) was still officially shouldered by the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing with the help of the Japanese orthodox priest Sergey Suzuki stationed in Manchuria, in 1924, with the Sino-Soviet agreement of mutual recognition, this task was officially handed over to the local Dalian Orthodox Church. In 1928 the Soviets were assumed to take over responsibilities for the cemeteries, though this did not work well. Thus, in 1935 the care for the cemetery had to be sustained again by the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Beijing sending the Russian hieromonk Georgy there. Furthermore, one of the officers who had lived through the Russo-Japanese War, Major Vasil’ev, served together with “White” General Mikhail Kanzhin on the Board of Trustees for the Russian cemeteries in the whole Dalian-Lüshun area. Vasil’ev asked to be buried with his fallen comrades at his own demise, and thus in 1935 he was the last to be buried in the Lüshun cemetery before 1945. From 1936 onward Russian general-turned-priest German (Isaev) served at the place who even held bees for honey and grew wine at the cemetery. During war time, the Japanese, however, insisted that the Russian Orthodox Archbishop of Beijing officially handed over all churches and cemeteries which the Beijing diocese previously had cared for in Manchuria to the Harbin diocese in Manchukuo. In fact, the situation in Manchuria was particularly complicated since on the one hand the Japanese Orthodox Church was looking after the Japanese faithful there, while theoretically, the Russians (often “stateless”) were in between the Harbin diocese in the North in Manchukuo, and Beijing which had traditionally cared for the cemeteries in the Dalian-Lüshun area. On the other, while the (“White”) émigrés in Manchuria, like the Beijing diocese up to the end of the war, were aligned with the anti-Soviet ROCOR synod, the Russian-born Metropolitan of Tokyo, Sergius (Tikhomirov), openly opted in 1931 to align the Japanese Orthodox Church with the Moscow Patriarchate, a move that led also to massive tensions in Japan and in the end forced him into retirement during the war. In southern Manchuria, it thus fell to Fr. Suzuki to

283 According to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s statistic (based on Koval), there were 49 Russian burials in the time 1898-1935 which were neither related to the Boxer Uprising nor the Russo-Japanese War plus the 9 (Western) foreigners. Available online: https://obd-memorial.ru/html/info.htm?id=1155160573&p=1. As mentioned, the Chinese and the Japanese were buried in other cemeteries.
284 Suzuki was mostly stationed as a priest in Shenyang (where he also looked after the Russian cemetery now erased) from where he cared also for the southern Liaodong peninsula. See Dalian gazetteer on religion Dalianshi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 170. A photo of him (at the former tsarist cemetery in Shenyang/Mukden) can be found in the illustration part of Zabytvyaa mogily (1938). He was a student of Nicholas of Japan, served in Manchuria since 1915, first in Dalian for the Japanese Orthodox, and died in Dalian in 1946. Cf. the online biography: https://drevo-info.ru/articles/27190.html. For the delicate position of the Japanese Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the jurisdiction and properties issues in the area, see Kharin (2014), pp. 229-230. Suzuki would be the only Japanese priest to take care of the Russians there. (Ibid. and p. 223.)
286 His photo on the tomb is – as several others – vandalized. To his side, the nurse who had cared for him and died in 1946 was buried, now enclosed together with a fence, though they were not married.
287 See Zabytvyaa mogily (1938), p. 29.
289 It might be briefly mentioned that Sergius had collected funds for reconstructing the Tokyo Cathedral destroyed during the Great Kantô Earthquake in 1923 from Russian émigrés in Manchuria. His pro-Moscow decision he made public only after the opening of the reconstructed cathedral in 1929, although he had privately established the
handle the situation between the Japanese and the Russian Orthodox, looking after both groups when needed, until the Russian cemeteries were cared for by émigré clergy again.

In August 1945, when the Soviet Red Army entered, they reportedly paid immediate tribute to their dead “compatriots”, suggesting the Soviet Union had now had made good for the tsarist failure of the Russo-Japanese war. The fallen of 1904/05 had died for “faith, Tsar and fatherland” but at a time when the political “problems” between the “Whites” and the “Reds” had not yet arisen. Thus, a commemoration was unproblematic in Soviet eyes. Since the name “Port Arthur” evoked in Russia the feeling of deep humiliation, the Soviet take-over was broadly perceived as a late revenge against the Japanese and a boost of national morale. Father German who had cared for the cemetery since a decade, though, was immediately arrested, and also General Khanzhin as a further “White” military who had, as mentioned, served on the Board of Trustees for this and the other Russian cemeteries in the Dalian-Lüshun area during the last years of the Japanese-controlled times, was sent to Soviet gulags.

While at first the dead of the August 1945 campaigns which were transferred to Lüshun were buried in between the tsarist tombs, wherever there was space, later the Eastern part of the cemetery was newly added for the now stationed Red Army troops and their families and thus became the “Soviet part”.

In 1955 when the Soviets left, a Sino-Soviet memorial stele was built to remember the fallen in the fight against the Japanese for the “freedom and happiness of the Soviet and Chinese peoples”, which is central to the Soviet part of the cemetery [ill. 59]. It is flanked by two kneeling bronze statues with lowered flags and weapons designed by a Soviet sculptor who used soldiers as models: one of the army and one of the navy. This impressive arrangement was to leave a strong Russian visual legacy to the Chinese who now took over completely. On a much smaller and more personal scale, a Chinese dedication to one of the very last burials in 1955, an army

contact already before. (Cf. Kharin 2014, p. 254). As a pro-Moscow foreigner, he was, on the other hand, suspected to be a Soviet spy in Japan.

290 According to the Dalian gazetteer on religion, Father German had left Lüshun in 1940 to serve at Manzhouli, a former White Army officer named Nikolay taking over, who would be shot by the Red Army in 1945: Daliangzi zhi. Zongjiaozhi (2002), p. 178. Koval (2011, p. 9), though, states that Father German stayed up to 1945 and was then sent to a labor camp by the Soviets. His original name was Oleg Isaev, and his daughters had moved from Shanghai to overseas. (See http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/liaoning/dalian/olegisaev_en.htm).


292 This means that de facto the “tsarist part” also contains several Soviet tombs – an argument the Russians have tried to use in the last years to refute Chinese attempts to strictly differentiate between both parts.

engineer [ill. 60], is a rare reminder that this Russian cemetery is located in China (and was from this point onward left in Chinese hands).

At closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the whole issue of setting a large-scale renovation of this cemetery on track owes much to the dedication of several individuals, above all the already mentioned Aleksandr Koval, a former geographer, who had spent his youth in Lüshun while the Soviets were stationed there, worked for the Red Army himself later and had already authored a Russian article on the cemetery in 2003. He had come back to Lüshun twice on official guided visits for Soviet “veterans” whom he accompanied, possible since the mid-1990s; once in 1996 and then in 2000. In 1996 he had noticed the rather dilapidated state, whereas in 2000 things in the Soviet part, which was only possible to officially visit, were renovated, e.g. with red stars in concrete put onto steles that had no longer their original (more valuable) metal ones. Since 1988, however, the cemetery (intending the Soviet part) was officially protected by the Chinese under the heritage protection law of 1982 which meant it could at least not be erased. Due to the 1995 regulations of the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs on protection of memorials of revolutionary “martyrs”, these had not only to be protected but also integrated into “patriotic and internationalist” education. In 1999 after consultations with Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus, the Dalian stele of 1953 with a huge Soviet soldier which had been damaged during the Cultural Revolution and was marked as protected heritage of Dalian in 1979, was transferred to the cemetery, thus “liberating” the Dalian “Stalin Square” which is now

294 He came together with a group of veterans led by the head of the China section among Russian veterans, Vasily Ivanov, who visited Lüshun (and other places with Soviet cemeteries in China) in 1996 and 2000. (Cf. Tian Zhihe 2010, p. 263). As mentioned, Ivanov et al. published the results of their survey of 1996 in 1997. There are some photos of the Lüshun cemetery’s Soviet part taken in 1996 (pp. 90-91 and pp. 242-246). They appear fairly tidy but might not have reflected the overall impression, since Koval complains of dilapidation. It should be borne in mind that such visits were always accompanied and “free photographing” was certainly not encouraged.

295 Koval (2003). According to Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 4, the renovation was undertaken in 1996, probably due to the complaints. As Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 214, notes, one of the problems for keeping the cemetery in good shape was the overlapping responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Culture, slowing down decisions. Whether the metal had gone for Great Leap Forward or other needs, is open to speculation.

296 This should be borne in mind as it did not mean that the place would be renovated; but it would at least be safe from bulldozing. Thus, the Russian claims (see below) that the Chinese had intended to erase the site in the 2000s, is unlikely or rather might have only affected the tsarist part which, technically speaking, is not to be protected in the Chinese point of view.


298 This shows Chinese awareness of the by now broader diplomatic implications after the end of the Soviet Union. See Dalianshi Lushunkouqu shizhi bangongshi 大连市旅顺口区史志办公室 (ed.): Lushunkou zhi zui 旅顺口之最 (The best of Lushunkou), Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe 2011, p. 45.

299 An on-spot plaque displays the heritage status. In 2002, it was upgraded to a provincial-level heritage site. However, most sources do not mention that the soldier’s statue had been severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, and thus he is now slimmer than originally, with a new foot and head and just one original medal that could be found again with two others substituted with replicas. Cf. Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 216, and Susu (2012), p. 395.

300 For more on the crafting of the stele and the casting of the Soviet soldier figure in the 1950s, see Ma Dianwen (2015), pp. 7-10. Ma, though, does not mention the later damage.
“People’s Square”, \(^{301}\) evicting the Soviet statue from Chinese public space, \(^{302}\) and thus “centralizing” Dalian’s Soviet legacy in Lüshun in a way. In the lower part, an exhibition is since 2012 integrated into the stele’s basement. \(^{303}\) When in 2001 the former Russian president Yeltsin came to visit, and later Medvedev in 2006 (as vice premier) and in 2010 (as acting Russian president), the (Soviet) cemetery was presented in a good shape. \(^{304}\) After his earlier experiences, Koval, in turn, sought out Zhang Daxian, a member of the Dalian Russian choir who visited Russia in 2004 on a friendship tour, where both met. Discovering that they both had spent their youth in the Dalian-Lüshun area where Zhang Daxian was born, who then studied Russian and was later professor of Russian at the Liaoning Normal University, they decided to undertake a careful on-site listing. This they did in 2008, resulting in Koval’s booklet of 2011 which, as noted, only appeared in Russian and in Russia. As will become obvious in the following, this was probably due to the fact that the “real” entity behind the project was the Russian Ministry of Defense, and that the project also included the tsarist part. In any case, Koval and Zhang also arranged for various visits of Russian veterans and relatives which led to media reporting in Russia and China and even to a Chinese TV documentary in two parts in 2015 to honor the 70th anniversary of WW II’s end, based on Zhang Daxian’s last visit to Russia in 2014 shortly before Koval and several of the old veterans who had re-visited Lüshun since the mid-1990s died. \(^{305}\)

Notably, on the Chinese side the whole story was framed coherently into one of a Chinese and a Russian (both active in Sino-Russian friendship activities) discovering their shared local experience in youth by chance and now paying tribute to the shared legacy between China and Russia/the Soviet Union by caring for the “Soviet martyrs’ cemetery”. The storyline suggests that it was the friendship tour of Zhang Daxian and the choir to Russia where he met Koval by chance, which set all on track, developing into a close personal friendship between the two who then discovered the site’s details together. Consequently, the fact, that Koval had been back to Lüshun already twice before, was deliberately ignored. That the booklet by Koval was only

\(^{301}\) For a photo of the “Stalin Square” in Dalian with the stele and soldier, i.e. before the transferal, see Lüshun tushi (2012), p. 259. See also Ivanov et al. (1997), p. 10 and p. 70. As mentioned above, the stele with soldier of 1953 had replaced the earlier Soviet stele of victory which was moved to Jinhzhou’s railway station and now stands in front of the Jinhzhou “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery”.


\(^{303}\) See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 57.

\(^{304}\) See Ma Dianwen (2015), p. 6 and pp. 56-64. It is notable that the e-book Port Arthur (see below) which is closely connected to Medvedev does not mention the Yeltsin visit at all! There are photos (e-book Port Arthur, p. 46) of the 2006 Medvedev visit in company of the Russian ambassador to China which sometimes is called “private” (e.g. e-book Port Arthur, p. 47) but was of course carefully scripted and accompanied. It should be also remembered that Lüshun as a naval base was still not open for free visits at the time. A further larger invited group visit mentioned by Tian Zhihe (2010), pp. 256-257, was by Russian veterans in the context of the 60th anniversary of the war’s end in 2005, including, e.g., Vasily Ivanov, the vice-head of the Sino-Russian friendship association and co-author of the 1997 survey.

\(^{305}\) The documentary is still available on DVD: Dalian wangshi: Sulian hongjun zai Lüda 大连往事。苏联红军在旅大 (Dalian’s past: The Soviet Red Army in Lüda), Dalian Radio and TV 2015. I am grateful to a local history professor for providing it for me.
published in Russian and in Russia with scant mention of Zhang Daxian and not directly addressing the financing and further background is also to be noted. De facto, on the Russian side, one of the richest men in Russia and member of the State Duma, Andrei Skoch, financed the restoration in 2008 to 2010, as an on-spot plaque reveals. For his efforts via his charity foundation “Pokolenie” (Generation) to memorialize Russian soldiers who died in China, he was honored by Russian then-president Medvedev in 2010.\(^\text{306}\) As one may conclude, the endeavor of Koval to take stock of the Lüshun cemetery together with Zhang Daxian was done in that context.\(^\text{307}\) For Skoch, one of the motivations was obviously to counter “PR strategies” of the US in China by making clear that the Soviets/Russians had contributed substantially militarily to war efforts in China’s interest.\(^\text{308}\) The project was included into a larger Public Relations initiative in cooperation with entrepreneur Kirill Elizarov who won a Silver Archer Award in 2010 for “development of public relations between Russia and China” by setting up an English language e-book *Port Arthur*, adding various Russian-language video clips, all called “Port Arthur”, including an art video with performance and music, designed “for the wives, brides, girlfriends and mothers” of the fallen and thus “civil” and emotional in outlook.\(^\text{309}\) Although Koval appears on several photos and video clips, the connection of the Koval booklet, the Ministry of Defense which hosts the memorial websites and sent the fact-finding missions before, the e-book “Port Arthur” and the “Pokolenie” foundation of the Duma member Skoch to act as a “private funding agency” is not made explicit. As it seems, the Russians tried to play by the Chinese rules to not jeopardize the whole.

In fact, it is quite striking, when comparing Chinese available source on the cemetery, and Russian ones, that two largely different narratives emerge. The role of officially private Russian funding and its de facto close connection to Russian politics tells much about the relationship between Russia and China, mirrored in this (and the other Russian) cemeteries. The whole background from the Russian point of view is addressed in a more detailed fashion in the named e-book *Port Arthur*.\(^\text{310}\) It is not stated why it was made available in English, but since the aim is


\(^{307}\) Cf. the e-booklet *Port Arthur* on this project where Koval also appears on the pictures, as does Skoch. See http://www.funcommunications.com/public-relations/port-arthur. For a video clip on the restoration of the cemetery with Skoch and Koval, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8oOvvCJ1Z7o.

\(^{308}\) See the e-booklet *Port Arthur*, p. 17.

\(^{309}\) Cf. Elizarov’s Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVqr5XizxsF6rEixARtc1A. The art project is called “No war stop the war”. Elizarov has been an invited speaker at the World Economic Davos Forum. See http://www.forumdavos.com/people/115. Here his award is highlighted in the following terms: “He received this award for ‘best of the best’ PR practices in the Russian Federation for ‘Project PORT ARTHUR (China) and Other Military Memorials Overseas as an Instrument for the advancement of Russia’s international reputation’”. The Silver Archer Award is set up to encourage Russian PR activities on a national and global scale.

\(^{310}\) However, not all claims made in this Russian publication should be taken at face value either, e.g. the claim that the area was threatened by urban development and that the project thus was a last-minute “saving” of the place,
public relations and to counter, in the end, US narratives on WW II in the Far East to put the Soviet Union back on record, not surprising. The e-book makes clear that the Chinese side was adamant in keeping the whole project as low-key as possible, requesting a strict “information embargo”,\(^{311}\) which also explains why one does not easily come across the materials. In fact, only on-spot visits where the funding is briefly acknowledged on a plaque, set the trail for digging deeper.

The Russian view on the Lüshun cemetery, which is not without reason also referred to with the “Western” name “Port Arthur”, an emotionally charged place name in Russia ever since the Russo-Japanese War,\(^{312}\) is closely connected to the military, either tsarist or Soviet, seeing all these dead as “compatriots” who died for the fatherland (and the Tsar or Stalin, depending on the times). The Russian project leaders, however, acknowledge that the Chinese strictly differentiated between the Soviet “positive” part and the “invading army” tsarist part which they objected to. Thus, a key strategy from the Russian side was to use the 65th anniversary of the end of WW II (2010) as the frame into which the restoration of the cemetery should be integrated: this experience is shared by China and Russia, and it is the key point to argue for China’s being “indebted” to Russia because of the August 1945 Soviet “liberation” of Manchuria, while the “common enemy” was Japan. This line of argument was acceptable to the Chinese side, and thus the officially private restoration (in which the Russians insisted to include the tsarist part on promise to keep it low-key) was officially inaugurated in 2010 with a group of veterans of the 1945 campaign.

A problem connected to 1945, though, was the commemoration dating: the worldwide perception of WW II’s end is connected to the victory over Hitler (May 8, in Russia: May 9). The other key date is the Tennô’s declaration of surrender of August 15. However, in Manchuria fighting went on for some more days, and the final signature of capitulation on the USS Missouri was in early September: in Tokyo Bay in the morning which in the US was still September 2. Thus, the might have been told by the Chinese, but is not very credible, given the fact that the area is still quite peripheral, the Soviet part is a Chinese protected unit since the 1980s, and the Chinese “martyrs” being in the cemetery aside (see below). It might have served as an argument on the Russian side, though, to point out the urgency of the project (and to ask for potential contributions to the effort).

\(^{311}\) As it seems, the Russians only partly kept that promise regarding the Russian public, as they also wanted to generate funds and to get into contact with veterans and families. On the Chinese side, though, the information embargo was enforced. (See, e.g., *Part Arthur* e-book p. 41). It is suggested that the Chinese price politics in massively driving up costs for restoration by asking wages for laborers based on US wages (!), was deliberate and an additional means to discourage further such projects. (Ibid. p. 43 and p. 53).

\(^{312}\) Since the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in the Russian strong-hold Port Arthur after the long siege was as traumatic on land as the Tsushima battle on sea, the name also easily evokes a lot of emotions in Russia. It might be only shortly noted that the novel already referred to above on the Russo-Japanese War, *Port Arthur: A Historical Narrative* of Aleksandr Stepanov, written during WW II, won a Stalin prize after the war during the time the Soviets had occupied the place again to make good for the “humiliation” of 1904.
question of inclusion of the September memorialization entailed the issues of the importance of the Pacific War vs. the European War, the importance of the US vs. the Soviet Union in the Pacific War/East Asian war theatre, and connected to that the dating: East Asian time or US time. In the eyes of the Russian Far East, if one commemorated the Far Eastern war theatre, it had to be September 3, and in fact Stalin had commemorated it once in 1946 on that day. Afterwards, though, also in Russian eyes the European War theatre’s end in May was the key date to commemorate. This left the Far Eastern parts of the Soviet Union and the Russian veterans of that short, but still bloody war dissatisfied,\(^{313}\) and as the September date involves also the issues over Sakhalin and the Kuril islands which the Soviets took from Japan in 1945,\(^{314}\) the question of commemoration involved the Russian-Japanese relationship and territorial claims unresolved between them. Thus, when Russian then-president Medvedev toured the East in 2010, his tour was designed to go from the Lüshun cemetery over Beijing and the Shanghai Expo (the main reason for the visit) up to Sakhalin and the Kuril islands, provoking the Japanese doubly. The mounting Russian-Japanese tensions finally made the Russians also reconsider the idea to integrate the September date into the canon of celebratory days, too, and thus in 2010, the “internationally used” September 2 (not September 3) was taken up and installed officially.\(^{315}\) (In the PRC, though, at the 70th anniversary, i.e. in 2015, a huge victory parade was held on the East Asian dating the Chinese cling to: September 3\(^{316}\))

Given the complicated diplomatic issues around the early September date, in 2010, Russian then-president Medvedev preferred to visit the cemetery rather later in September during his programmed state visit to China where he met also with Chinese “veterans” to drive home the message of Sino-Russian “common fight” against the Japanese. The trip to the Kuril Islands was at that point, however, postponed.\(^{317}\) At his trip to Lüshun, Medvedev who is of the United Russia Party, however, had also invited representatives of the politically rivalling Russian Communist Party, and the Chinese, in turn, included in the group of “Chinese veterans” Medvedev was to meet also Li Min 李敏, daughter of Mao Zedong who had been in the Soviet Union herself in young years (and is de facto no “veteran”)\(^{318}\). The trip thus was very multi-layered, providing images of the head of the Russian Communist Party Zyuganov appearing

\(^{313}\) Cf. the e-book *Port Arthur*, p. 51. The Soviet casualties of the war of which most were buried in Manchuria, were over 8,000. See Tian Zhihe (2010), p. 15. As mentioned, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov even spoke of 12,000.

\(^{314}\) For the Soviet offensive, the so-called “August storm”, and the consequences for Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from the Russian point of view, see Glantz (2003), esp. chapters 9 and 10.

\(^{315}\) See the e-book *Port Arthur*, which names as 4 key results of the project: 1. The biggest non-governmental Sino-Russian project solved a state problem; 2. the biggest historical military memorial in Asia has been restored; 3. the Russian claim in the argument between Russia and Japan about the “northern territories” has been emphasized; 4. the V-Japan Day has been put back on the memorial days’ list. (There pp. 68-73.)

\(^{316}\) Interestingly, in Japan the usually provided dating of the surrender signature is also September 2, i.e. in accord with the US, while the Chinese follow Stalin, so to speak.

\(^{317}\) Cf. e-book *Port Arthur* p. 55.

\(^{318}\) Incidentally, there was a same-named female “real veteran” from Heilongjiang present, though, as well! Li Min, daughter of He Zizhen 贺子珍 and Mao, had lived 1941-1947 in the Soviet Union as a child.
under a cross, but also a photo shooting of Mao’s daughter Li Min (who is said to deplore the fact that she had not had the occasion to do it with Stalin) now with Medvedev as a representative of the country “that brought us Communism, Marxism and Stalinism”!\textsuperscript{319} For the Russian side, the Medvedev visit was, however, the ideal moment to temporarily get out of the Chinese-imposed “information embargo” around the cemetery’s restoration at least for the Russian public.\textsuperscript{320}

The restoration of the cemetery, which the Russians had also different ideas about in terms of techniques than the Chinese,\textsuperscript{321} entailed for the Russian side all buried in the Lüshun cemetery. As this also included Muslims and Jews of tsarist times, also a rabbi and a mufti were invited to the opening, together with an orthodox priest who also officially accompanied the installation of the new St. Nicholas the Wonderworker icon on the tsarist cross for the casualties of the Russo-Japanese War which had been destroyed but was documented by old photos found in Russian archives.\textsuperscript{322}

But also inner-Russian debates are reflected in this project: notably, apart from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Russian embassy in China, who are all partners that could be expected and had cared about the military cemeteries in China already earlier,\textsuperscript{323} the Russian Presidential Administration and the “Commission for the Countering of False Revision of Russian History” (established in 2009 by Russian then-president Medvedev) are named as the ones “ordering” the project. This shows not only how high-level the project was, but that it was also connected to the attempts to counter “false” history views, intending the criticism towards the Soviet Union and “denial” of Soviet contributions to WW II in Russia, the

\textsuperscript{319} This “spicy” news was picked up by Russian newspapers. See, e.g., \textit{Kommersant} (Businessman), September 27, 2010, p. 8: ”"Simvol strany, prineshchey nam kommunizm, marksizm i stalinizm". Dmitriya Medvedeva vstrechayut v Kitae” ("The symbol of the country that brought us Communism, Marxism and Stalinism". Dmitry Medvedev in China).

\textsuperscript{320} Cf. the comments of Elizarov during a Russian lecture uploaded in his youtube channel to this avail: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zE9Bvs-ErdY, min. 1:14-2:47.

\textsuperscript{321} The Russians complained that the Chinese wanted to raze the old monuments and put in similar looking new ones, something the Russians would not accept. (See \textit{Port Arthur} e-book, p. 47.)

\textsuperscript{322} For some photos, see http://www.orthodox.cn/contemporary/liaoning/dalian/20100925lushuncemetery_en.htm#1. According to a filmed presentation of Elizarov on the restoration project available on Youtube, the restoration team involved archives in Moscow and St. Petersburg as well as private people via letters who checked for materials to ascertain the original outlook since the icon on spot was defaced. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bLAX31SfVo0&tl=125s, min. 3:44-4:12).

\textsuperscript{323} According to the \textit{Port Arthur} e-book, p. 23, the head of a delegation of the Ministries which had toured China in 2004 to take stock of the grave sites, Aleksandr Kirillin, reported quite negative impressions, which shows that the “care” on the Chinese side for the cemeteries had been rather selective and urged the Russians to take matters in hand.
former Soviet Republics and beyond.\textsuperscript{324} Since in present-day Russia the tsarist times are re-appreciated and also seen as potentially more unifying vis-à-vis the more divisive Soviet times, it comes as no surprise that the tsarist part of the cemetery is emphasized in the project financed by Andrei Skoch.\textsuperscript{325} This project, furthermore, was seen only as one step in the larger scheme to preserve and reconstruct military grave sites as a State Target Program 2011-2015,\textsuperscript{326} which means that also other Russian/Soviet cemeteries in China were then integrated into that state target program. As noted above, also the Qingyunjie and the Jinzhou Cemetery were “treated” at the time, which led up to the 70th anniversary of the end of WW II in 2015. As mentioned, part of the motivation therefore was to counter the perceived well-organized US efforts to honor their fallen who contributed to the worldwide (and to China’s) battle against the Japanese as much as against Hitler which suggested the more important role of the Americans vis-à-vis the Russians in WW II.\textsuperscript{327} Thus, Russia needed “PR campaigns” to make sure its role was re-appreciated also in China.

An additional problem, however, is, that the former “Soviet” (and in part tsarist) cemeteries, though often seen today simply as “Russian”, also cover other parts of the Soviet Union (Russian Empire) now being separate states. Thus, when celebrations of WW II’s end took place from the Chinese side, they also invited further diplomatic representatives, although it is not known whether those countries cared for “their” tombs in Lüshun or Dalian and Jinzhou. Some of those would also rather not like to memorialize their “Sovietized” past, above all if it is connected to the Red Army.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the Lüshun “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” (in Chinese parlance), different from the other Soviet cemeteries we have addressed, has been joined by the Chinese “martyrs cemetery” [ill. 61, 62]. Here, the Chinese “volunteers” in the Korean War waged close-by were to be buried,\textsuperscript{328} thus linking the Communist “martyrs”/“heroes” of both countries with only a wall separating them, but a gate providing access from one to the other.

\textsuperscript{324} A particularly upsetting case for the Russian official view seems to have been Estonia where, as already mentioned, monuments for the “liberating” Soviets were attacked as symbols of oppression.

\textsuperscript{325} Port Arthur e-book, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{326} Port Arthur e-book, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{327} Cf. ibid. p. 17. It should be noted, however, that the American Battle Monuments Commission responsible for American overseas military cemeteries and monuments maintains no military cemetery in the whole of East Asia, but for South Korea (and even there only 36 American tombs among the over 2,000 UN casualties of the Korean War buried there are to be found, though over 30,000 Americans alone died during that war on the UN side). (Cf. https://www.abmc.gov/cemeteries-memorials/pacific/korean-war-monument-busan). Wherever possible, the Americans tended to transfer home their fallen. Cf. in Shanghai in the years following WW II where the military complained to the Guomindang mayor and requested to transfer its dead back to the US. See Müller (2018a), p. 31.

\textsuperscript{328} This is suggested by the Lüshun gazetteer of 1999, which states that this was made public only in 1956 after the war. See Daliannishi Lüshunkouqu shizhi bangongshi 大连市旅顺口区史志办公室: Lüshunkou quzhi 旅顺口区志 (Lüshunkou district gazetteer), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 1999, p. 584.
directly leading up to the Sino-Soviet friendship stele placed centrally in the Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery. Notably, the Chinese cemetery includes also cadres that died normally, by this enlarging the concept of “martyr” and calling the cemetery also “August One”, i.e. with the founding date of the Chinese Red Army, today’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in spite of hosting also civil cadres. According to an on-spot plaque, this cemetery was set up in 1951 already and thus renamed as a “martyrs’” one only years after the Korean war, i.e. in 1956. The “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery”, called this way since 1955, is, as mentioned, notably a Chinese patriotic education and heritage site, and thus the Soviet “martyrs” may be visited together with the adjoining Chinese ones by school classes etc. for whom the Chinese “martyrs’ cemetery” is an “outdoor education base”. In fact, whereas the Dalian Qingyunjie and the Jinzhou cemetery are closed off (and not with a Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery aside), the Lüshun Soviet and Chinese Martyrs’ Cemeteries are open to visitors. Today, furthermore, Lüshun district tries to use its multi-faceted past for attracting tourists. There are even some who would like to see Lüshun classified as a UNESCO world heritage site, de facto over its “dead”, in a line with Auschwitz and Hiroshima, though! On the other hand, the Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery also has been made to serve for youth exchange programs between Russia and China, centrally done in the more relaxed holiday atmosphere of the Dalian beaches, but including an “educative trip” to Lüshun’s cemetery. In Lüshun, the Chinese “credentials” of the fight against the Japanese are also underlined by naming a park after local “hero” Jin Boyang 金伯阳, a Lüshun native who died in guerilla activities against the Japanese in 1933. Although he did not die in Lüshun, the “Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery” hosts a surrogate tomb (yiguanzhong 衣冠冢) for him as is Chinese custom when remains have not been available (or are elsewhere) [ill. 63]. This “Chinese Martyrs’ Cemetery” with over 350 tombs was also renovated in 2010, obviously to not stay behind the Russian initiatives next door. Among the tombs, there are notably also Chinese casualties of the Vietnam War when China helped the North Vietnamese against the US [ill. 63].


330 The same holds true for Harbin (see above).

331 E.g., glossy illustrated multi-language publications on historical sites have been designed. See, e.g., Meili Lüshunkou 魅力旅顺口 (Fascinating Lüshunkou), Beijing: Zhongguo shying chubanshe 2011; or Lü Tongju 吕同举 (ed.): Shenmi de Lüshun 神秘的旅顺 (“Mysterious Lushun”), Beijing: Zhongguo lüyyou chubanshe 2009.

332 See Liu Junyong 刘俊勇: “Dalian wenhua yichen baohu yanjiu” 大连文化遗产保护研究 (Study of the conservation of cultural heritage in Dalian). In: Dalian jindaishi yanjiu 大连近代史研究 (Studies of the Modern History of Dalian), vol. 6, 2009, pp. 501-512, there p. 511. This refers to the First Sino-Japanese War with the Lushun Massacre, the Russo-Japanese War, the “August Storm” of 1945 and the Korean War of which casualties are all present in Lüshun. To this, the “anti-Japanese resistance fighters” killed in the Lushun prison can be added.


334 Although the plaque at the entrance of the cemetery admits this to be only a surrogate tomb, on spot the memorial set up in 1981 does not mention this [cf. ill. 63].
And one may find even Communist-starred tombs with offerings in front – showing that although cadres are forbidden officially to adhere to any religion, traditional mourning rites are not even totally absent from “martyrs’ / PLA veterans’ cemeteries” [ill. 65].

Concluding remarks

The cases above have reflected through the lens of cemeteries the multi-faceted roles Russia/the Soviet Union has played in China’s history and the divergent views on single facets of these roles between both countries. While views might differ, physical remains are a fact to deal with. They involve practical matters as well as perceptions and value judgements. They embody national issues but are also individual and private, though families might long have left or have never lived there. Some died “for a cause”, others did by chance, age, illness or accident in a foreign land some, though, had come to call home, e.g. the so-called Harbiners. The cemeteries are also culturally and religiously inscribed, and they raise questions about identity ascriptions. Since they cover space, issues of sovereignty are attached to them: who owns the space? Who may decide over land use? And who should be memorialized and who not? Who decides? Given the fact that but for Harbin’s orthodox cemetery, the other cases discussed here are exclusively “foreign”, they necessarily involve diplomatic issues. The military component, furthermore, is especially complicating things since China has no tradition of keeping also cemeteries of foreign soldiers, let alone former enemy ones. And if they should be kept officially, because they “helped China” as the Soviets did, they are also to underline that China is exceptional in keeping to that tradition “faithfully” (while others have not). This is connected on the one hand to the “apostasy” of the former Communist countries, be it the Baltic States or Eastern Europe where Soviet “liberation” has been criticized as “oppression”, most notably in the case of Estonia where the violent contestations about dismantling a Soviet memorial or not have been reported also in China, seeing behind the move “ungratefulness” and a “distortion of history”. On the other, Russia’s own balancing out vis-à-vis the Soviet heritage is challenged, showing that the Chinese are the “true heirs”. Needless to say, in China the memorialization is appropriated by the state to guarantee it stays in the limits politically correct at a given time. For a “normal Chinese”, such foreign cemeteries are, however, also a visible and tangible way to encounter close to home

336 Cf. the interesting case of the French Military Cemetery in Keelung, Taiwan, linked to the Sino-French War of 1884/85. See Müller (2018b), pp. 27-32.
another way of dealing with a fate all living beings share. Apart from the Soviet cemeteries which have exerted influence on the way the PRC frames the memorialization of her own “martyrs”, the Orthodox and Jewish cemeteries tell of another “West” which is not only “imperialist”, “militarist”, or “capitalist”, but also religious, and for good or for worse is intermingled historically with China. The ambivalence demonstrated on the Chinese (official) side that has been documented in the above, is therefore not only an attitude towards the other, but, willy-nilly, involves also self-perceptions in China.
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HARBIN

1 Memorial for the fallen during the Boxer Uprising ©2018

2 Jewish cemetery section, entrance ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

3 Mix of plaques and tombstones ©2018

4 Example of plaques standing in for lost tombstones with unascertained spelling: Zantlaz Yankel / Yankel Zantliaufer / Yankel Zantlauffer ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

5 Example of reassembled tombstone with lost photo ©2018

6 Reassembled tombstone ©2018
7 Reassembled and rebuilt old tombs ©2018

8 English-language Jewish tombstone ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

9 Cut-out angle to make space for Chinese burials ©2018

10 Newly restored tomb of Ehud Olmert’s grandfather ©2018
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11 Ehud Olmert’s thanks to Harbin ©2018

12 Tomb of Rabbi Kiselev ©2018
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13 View into the Orthodox Cemetery ©2018

14 View into the Orthodox Cemetery ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

15 Tomb of Russian monk Ignaty ©2018

16 Tomb of Father Baryshnikov (front side) ©2018
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17 Plea to not destroy the tombstone at Father Baryshnikov’s tomb (backside) ©2018

18 Double tombstone on Russian priest Avsenev’s tomb ©2018
19 Scattered old tombstones ©2018

20 Tomb of Archpriest He Hailin ©2018
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21 Tomb of Archpriest Wu Zhiqian ©2018

22 Tomb of Grigory Zhu Shipu, last priest buried in the cemetery ©2018
23 Tomb of a Russian mother of a Sino-Russian mixed family (post-Cultural Revolution) ©2018

24 Westernized tomb of the Sino-Russian Hu family ©2018
25 Restored tomb of doctor Kazem-Bek ©2018

26 Tomb of a “White” colonel and family ©2018
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27 Newer tombs section ©2018

28 Restored tomb for those who died from their wounds in Harbin during the Russo-Japanese War ©2018
29 Restored tomb of Captain Kornil’ev ©2018

30 Polish tomb ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

31 Huangshan Soviet Military/”Martyrs” Cemetery ©2018

32 Differentiation in tombstone outlook ©2018
DALIAN QINGYUNJIE

33 Soviet era part: soldiers’ tombs ©2018

34 Soviet era part: officers’ tombs ©2018
35 Tomb of the Enisey mine-layer casualties during the Russo-Japanese War ©2018

36 Civilian tombs: Feliks Briner and relatives ©2018
37 Tomb of a non-Russian sailor ©2018

38 Tomb of priest Marin Korovin ©2018
JINZHOU

39 Stele now at the entrance to the Jinzhou Soviet Cemetery ©2018

40 View of a part of the Soviet Cemetery ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

41 Walled-off memorial to the Russo-Japanese War dead ©2018

42 Memorial to aviators ©2018
43 Example of tombstone featuring the symbol of the military unit (tank) (photo of deceased missing) ©2018

44 Recent collective memorialization wreath ©2018
LUŞHUN

45 Stele with statue now at the entrance of the Lüshun Cemetery ©2018

46 The aviators’ section of the Korean War ©2018
47 Children’s section ©2018

48 Example of a Soviet family member tomb ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

49 Soviet section ©2018

50 Tombs in the small Jewish section ©2018
51 Non-Russian tomb ©2018

52 Earliest tombs of 1898 ©2018
53 Nameless Japanese-era crosses for 1904/05 Russian war dead interspersed with Soviet-era ones (with dropped flags) ©2018

54 Japanese-built officers’ tombs ©2018
Example of collective tomb for Russian war dead at single battle sites erected by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War ©2018

Japanese-built mausoleum ©2018
57 Tomb of a nurse named Ekaterina ©2018

58 Restored tsarist huge cross for the Russo-Japanese War dead ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

59 Central stele ©2018

60 Tomb of one of the last buried Soviet Army members in 1955, featuring a Chinese dedication (on bottom) ©2018
Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun

61 Chinese “Martyrs’ Cemetery” ©2018

62 View of some tombs in the Chinese “Martyrs’ Cemetery” ©2018
63 Surrogate tomb of local “martyr” Jin Boyang ©2018

64 Tomb of a PLA member fallen in the Vietnam War (backside of tombstone with biography) ©2018
65 Traditional mourning rites at an old PLA veteran’s tomb ©2018